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I. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
1. Mandamus Relief Available
a. Discovery RulingsA in previous Survey periods, the Texas courts of appeals con-
tinue to grant mandamus relief from orders compelling discov-
ery of privileged information.' The courts also consistently grant
mandamus relief to compel production of documents that have been er-
roneously protected by an invalid claim of privilege. 2
b. Orders Compelling Apex Deposition
Mandamus will issue to compel the court of appeals to vacate its order
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Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
**** B.A., summa cum laude, Stephen F. Austin University; J.D., magna cum laude,
Baylor University; Associate, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. See, e.g., In re NationsBank, N.A., No. 01-99-00278-CV, 2000 WL 960274 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2000, orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus to correct
trial court order ordering production of privileged documents); In re Osteopathic Med.
Ctr. of Tex., 16 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) (issuing man-
damus to compel trial court to modify its discovery order to the extent the order compelled
production of privileged medical peer review documents); In re Fontenot, 13 S.W.3d 111
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus to protect disclosure of
attorney-client communications); In re Doe, 22 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, orig.
proceeding) (finding trial court abused its discretion in requiring plaintiff to produce
mental health records at early stage of discovery); In re Arras, 24 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 2000, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting mandamus to prevent deposition of
claims representative who was not party to lawsuit); In re Guzman, 19 S.W.3d 522, 525
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding) (ordering trial court to vacate order
compelling relator to execute authorizations for release of personal information to third
parties; authorizations did not exist at time of ruling).
2. See, e.g., In re Jimenez, 4 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig.
proceeding) (ordering the trial court to compel production of a witness statement after
finding that such statements are not protected by the work product privilege).
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allowing an apex deposition. 3 The standards for an apex deposition were
adopted in Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia,4 and followed by the
Texas Supreme Court in In re Daisy Mfg. Co. . Under Crown Central, a
party seeking to compel the deposition of a specific high-level corporate
official must show not only that less-intrusive discovery methods were
employed, but must also articulate how the less-intrusive discovery was
unsatisfactory, insufficient, or inadequate. 6 In Daisy, the plaintiff sought
to depose the CEO of Daisy Manufacturing based on statements made by
the CEO in a television interview.7 In seeking to compel the CEO's dep-
osition, the plaintiff showed that it had deposed other officers of Daisy
Manufacturing and still desired additional information.8 Because the
plaintiff failed to show how the less-intrusive discovery of the other cor-
porate officials was inadequate or insufficient and failed to show that the
CEO of Daisy had any unique information that could not be obtained by
less-intrusive means, the Court conditionally granted mandamus relief
compelling the court of appeals to vacate its order allowing the apex
deposition.9
In another mandamus proceeding involving apex depositions, the
Court also relied on Crown Central in denying mandamus relief for a
party seeking to compel an apex deposition. 10 In In re Alcatel USA, Inc.,
the Court reasoned that a party seeking to depose a high ranking execu-
tive cannot establish the executive's unique or superior knowledge by
showing that the executive possesses knowledge of company policies or
by showing that he has some knowledge of discoverable information, such
as the contents of a report.1' A party fails to show that less-intrusive
means of discovery are inadequate when the party neither (1) identifies
information it attempted and failed to obtain from other deponents, nor
(2) issues interrogatories, requests for admission, or other forms of dis-
covery regarding information it seeks to obtain from the executive. 12 The
dissent agreed that a showing of ultimate policy authority is insufficient
evidence of an executive's unique or superior knowledge, but would have
held that the standard was met by a showing that an executive received a
written and oral presentation and several reports on the information
sought.13
3. See In re Daisy Mfg. Co., 17 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
4. 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995).





10. See In re Alcatel USA, Inc., 11 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding).
11. Id. at 179.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 181 (Enoch, J. dissenting).
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c. Orders Compelling Production of Trade Secrets
In In re Leviton Mfg. Co.,14 the Waco Court of Appeals found that the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering the relator to produce privi-
leged trade secret information.' 5 Once the court found that the trade
secret privilege is established, the burden shifted under Rule 507 of the
Texas Rules of Evidence to the party seeking disclosure to show that the
information was necessary to a fair adjudication of the claim. 16 Because
the trial court ordered the production of privileged trade secret informa-
tion, the court of appeals conditionally granted mandamus ordering the
trial court to vacate its order requiring production of the privileged
materials. 17
d. Orders Governing Access to Court Records
Rule 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the sealing of
court records, including discovery not filed with the court. In In re The
Dallas Morning News, Inc.,18 the underlying parties in a suit against an
HMO entered into a Rule 11 agreement whereby the plaintiffs agreed not
to disclose any documents produced and designated by the HMO as con-
fidential. 19 After those parties settled, The Dallas Morning News inter-
vened and moved for access to some of the unfiled discovery subject to
the Rule 11 agreement. 20 The trial court set a hearing to determine
whether those materials were "court records."'z
The court of appeals granted mandamus relief to have the order set
aside, concluding that absent a Rule 76a order sealing court records the
trial court was without jurisdiction. 22 Without analysis, the supreme
court concluded that "the court of appeals should not have granted man-
damus relief," and the court granted mandamus ordering the court of ap-
peals to withdraw its order.23
Justice Abbott, joined by Justices Enoch, Hankinson and O'Neill, filed
a concurring opinion, holding that the court of appeals should not have
granted mandamus relief because the trial court had jurisdiction to set a
hearing on the motion.24 Justice Gonzales, joined by Justices Phillips,
Hecht, and Owen, would have held that mandamus was not proper be-
cause there was an adequate remedy by appeal. 25 Justice Baker, concur-
ring and dissenting, would have held that there is an adequate remedy by
14. 1 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999) (orig. proceeding).
15. Id. at 903.
16. Id. at 902.
17. Id. at 903.
18. 10 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 298.




24. 10 S.W.3d at 299-303 (Abbott, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 303-06 (Gonzales, J., concurring).
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appeal and that the order was immediately appealable.2 6
e. Orders Sustaining Relevance Objection
In In re Union Pac. Resource Co.,2 7 the supreme court held that the
trial court acted within its discretion in partially sustaining relevance ob-
jections to discovery. Although no evidence was presented in support of
objections, no evidence was necessary to resolve the issue of relevance of
settlement agreements in another lawsuit.28 Because the court of appeals
erroneously granted mandamus relief compelling the trial court to order
production of the irrelevant documents, the supreme court issued manda-
mus against the court of appeals ordering the court to vacate its ruling.
29
f. Orders Refusing to Compel Arbitration Under the Federal
Arbitration Act
As in previous Survey periods, the courts continue to grant mandamus
relief where a trial court refuses to compel arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 30 In In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., the Court held
that an arbitration clause in a contract between parties residing in differ-
ent states involves interstate commerce and invokes the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. 31 Because there is no adequate remedy by appeal for a party
denied the right to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court
granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to issue an order compel-
ling arbitration.32
In an issue of first impression, the Houston First Court of Appeals was
asked to determine whether a trial court may abate its ruling on arbitra-
tion until after discovery is completed. 33 The answer, according to the
First Court of Appeals, is a resounding "no."' 34 The court reasoned that
"[d]elaying a decision on the merits of arbitrability until after discovery
substantially defeats the policy behind [Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code] section 171.021's 35 abbreviated procedure [for determining
26. Id. at 306-08 (Baker, J., concurring).
27. 22 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
28. See id. at 338.
29. Id.
30. See In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceed-
ing) (per curiam). See also In re Alamo Lumber Co., 23 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2000) (orig. proceeding); Cf. In re Van Blarcum, No. 13-99-281-CV, 2000 WL
374817 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Apr. 6, 2000, orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus to
vacate trial court order compelling arbitration because the Federal Arbitration Act was
superceded by Magnusson Moss Warranty Act, which bars the use of binding arbitration
clauses in written warranties).
31. Id. at 127-28.
32. Id. at 128.
33. See In re MHI Partnership, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999) (orig. proceeding).
34. Id. at 923.
35. Section 171.021 provides in relevant part:
(a) A court shall order the parties to arbitrate an application of a party
showing:
(1) an agreement to arbitrate; and
[Vol. 541096
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when arbitration is mandated], and it violates section 171.021's mandate
to decide the issues summarily. '36
g. Orders Granting Injunctive Relief
In In re Univ. Interscholastic League,37 the supreme court conditionally
granted the petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to
vacate orders "(1) requiring the UIL to hold a baseball playoff game...
(2) finding the UIL in contempt because [it] did not schedule the game as
ordered; and (3) declaring Robstown, rather than Roma, the winner of
the unplayed game."'38 Finding that there was no evidence that the UIL's
rulings violated any constitutional rights of the parents or children denied
the right to play in the playoff game and finding no adequate remedy at
law because the baseball tournament was currently in progress, the Court
issued mandamus relief directing the "trial court to immediately vacate
its orders."' 39
h. Orders Disqualifying Counsel
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in disqualifying a testifying
attorney from participating at trial, but mandamus will issue to correct
the trial court's improper disqualification of an attorney on pretrial
matters. 40
i. Orders Entered Without Jurisdiction
Mandamus will issue where the trial court enters orders without juris-
diction. In In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,4' the supreme court granted
mandamus relief to correct a trial court's order vacating a venue ruling
made one year earlier. 42 The court noted that the trial court's plenary
jurisdiction over the case had expired thirty days after the transfer order
was entered,43 making the order vacating the venue ruling untimely and
void.44 In In re Cornyn,45 the First Court of Appeals sitting in Houston
(2) the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate.
(b) If a party opposing an application made under Subsection (a) denies the
existence of the agreement, the court shall summarily determine that issue.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
36. MH1, 7 S.W.3d at 923.
37. 20 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 691.
39. Id. at 692.
40. See In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000) (orig. proceeding).
41. No. 99-1212, 2000 WL 854253 (Tex. June 29, 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
42. Id.
43. Id. at *2.
44. Id. at *2. See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-99-00257-CV, 2000 WL 10608
(Tex. App.-El Paso Jan. 6, 2000) (orig. proceeding) (holding mandamus will issue to com-
pel trial court to vacate order setting case for trial after the case was dismissed for want of
prosecution and after plenary expired; although issuance of dismissal order was a clerical
mistake, trial court failed to issue a timely written order of reinstatement). See also In re
Ramsey, 28 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000) (orig. proceeding) (finding man-
damus will issue where one court directly interferes with the jurisdiction of another court).
45. 27 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000) (orig. proceeding).
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held that TRO's orders entered by a trial court prohibiting further exami-
nation and retention of property seized pursuant to criminal search war-
rants were entered without jurisdiction and in direct violation of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 46 Mandamus would issue because the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the temporary orders. 47
j. Ministerial Acts
In many cases during this Survey period, the courts of appeal granted
mandamus relief to order trial courts to perform ministerial acts man-
dated by statute. For instance, in In re Bridges,48 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals granted mandamus ordering the trial court to enter a judgment
nunc pro tunc to reflect the dismissal only of the nonsuited defendant.
Noting that the trial court has a ministerial duty to dismiss any party that
has been voluntarily nonsuited but has no authority to dismiss parties not
subject to the voluntary nonsuit, the court found that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to correct its order mistakenly dismissing
all defendants. 49
Appellate courts generally do not have mandamus jurisdiction over dis-
trict court clerks.50 In In re Washington'51 however, the First Court of
Appeals held that it had jurisdiction "to issue a writ of mandamus against
a district clerk for failure to forward to the appropriate court of appeals a
notice of appeal delivered to him for filing because such is necessary to
enforce [the appellate court's] jurisdiction. '52
Mandamus will also issue to compel a city secretary to withdraw an
administrative declaration of ineligibility to be named as a candidate in a
city council election. 53 The Waco Court of Appeals reasoned that a city
secretary has no fact-finding authority, and the fact that the candidate
cast a ballot in another precinct does not conclusively establish that the
46. Id. at 335.
47. Id. See also In re Sensitive Care Inc., 28 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000)
(orig. proceeding) (finding exceptional circumstances warranting mandamus relief despite
final, appealable turnover order because order entered in violation of temporary bank-
ruptcy stay and without jurisdiction).
48. 28 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000) (orig. proceeding).
49. Id. at 195. See also In re Vorwerk, 6 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999) (orig.
proceeding) (finding that trial court abused its discretion by ignoring a party's request to
transfer a case from a constitutional county court to a statutory probate court in contraven-
tion to the mandatory provisions of section 5(b) of the Texas Probate Code); In re Kramer,
9 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1.999) (orig. proceeding) (stating that mandamus
will issue to correct trial court's failure to transfer venue in a suit affecting the parent-child
relationship under the Family Code's mandatory venue provision); In re Middlebrook, 7
S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999) (orig. proceeding); In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d 412 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1999) (orig. proceeding) (issuing a mandamus to correct a trial court's failure
to dismiss a DPRS suit that had expired under the Texas Family Code §263.401(a)).
50. See In re Carson, 12 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000) (orig. proceeding)
(finding court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the
operating officer of the Inmate Trust Fund because officer was not a judge).
51. 7 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
52. Id. at 182.
53. In re Jackson, 14 S.W.3d 843, 849 (Tex. App.- Waco 2000) (orig. proceeding).
1098 [Vol. 54
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candidate failed to meet the residency requirements under the city
charter.54
k. Interlocutory Orders
Mandamus will issue where a trial court attempts to circumvent appel-
late review of its judgment through interlocutory orders. In In re Tarrant
County, Tarrant and Denton counties disputed the location of a county
line. 55 To maintain continuing jurisdiction over the resurveying process
the trial court refused to enter final judgment in the case, choosing in-
stead to enter an interlocutory judgment permitting Denton county to
mark and monument the county line before final judgment was entered.5 6
Noting that municipalities have the authority to supersede a judgment
simply by filing a notice of appeal but that no notice of appeal could be
filed until there was a final judgment, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
found that the trial court abused its discretion in entering an interlocutory
order that deprived Tarrant county of its right to supersede the judg-
ment.57 Accordingly, mandamus would issue to order the trial court to
enter a final, appealable judgment from which Tarrant county could ap-
peal and supersede. 58
2. Mandamus Relief Unavailable.
In numerous cases during this Survey period where the supreme court
denied mandamus relief without issuing a written opinion, Justices Hecht
and Owen issued dissenting opinions highlighting the court's increased
unwillingness to grant mandamus relief.59 For instance, in In re Gaylord
Broad. Co.,60 Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Owen, criticized the court
for summarily denying mandamus against a judge who refused to allow a
television station to film courtroom proceedings solely because the sta-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 916.
56. Id. at 917.
57. Id. at 918.
58. Id.
59. See In re Texas Farmers Ins. Exch., 12 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding)
(Hecht, J. dissenting) (arguing in support of mandamus relief from trial court's refusal to
issue a protective order to prevent discovery of the results of an attorney's investigation of
client's claim, which the dissent would have held to be an attorney-client privileged com-
munication); In re Avila, 22 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J. dissent-
ing) (Justice Hecht, not joined by Justice Owen, would have granted mandamus relief from
trial court order compelling relator to answer whether her attorney referred her to a physi-
cian for treatment, which Justice Hecht believed was a privileged attorney-client communi-
cation); In re Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 8 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)
(Hecht, J. dissenting) (dissenting from denial of mandamus from a ruling upholding local
rules that permit transfers from one court to another court in the same county because the
transfer would circumvent statute and state court rules and nullify the assignment of
judges); In re GNC Franchising, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht,
J. dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of petition for writ of mandamus from order
refusing to enforce contractual forum-selection clauses); In re Kennedy Funding, Inc., No.
00-0533, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. .899 (June 22, 2000) (orig. proceeding) (same).
60. 22 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, dissenting).
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tion had broadcast news stories critical of the judge, while allowing other
television stations to film the proceedings. Justice Hecht noted that by
denying mandamus, the court allowed the trial judge to violate the press's
constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings.61
Justices Hecht and Owen would also support mandamus relief where
the trial court grants a new trial without stating the basis for its ruling.62
According to the dissent, it was not sufficient that the trial court stated in
its order granting new trial that a new trial is "in the interest of justice
and fairness."'63
In In re Living Ctrs. of Am., 64 Justice Owen, joined by Justice Hecht,
dissented to the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus because the
proceedings in the trial court were automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) after one of the defendants filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
a. Attorney Disqualification
In the previous Survey period, in In re EPIC Holdings (EPIC I), the
supreme court ordered the disqualification of certain law firms because
the firm's previous representation of the opposing party was substantially
related to the present litigation and the firms questioned the validity of
the work previously performed in the current litigation.65
In a related proceeding during this Survey period, the court was asked
to resolve the novel question of whether the law firm hired by the plain-
tiff after the disqualifications in EPIC I could have access to the disquali-
fied law firms' work product.66 In In re George, the court of appeals
found that the relators had waived their rights by failing to timely move
to restrict the successor firm's access to the former law firms' work prod-
uct. 67 The supreme court rejected the court of appeals' finding of waiver
and found that while the successor firm should have access to public
records the successor firm's access to work product may be restricted or
prohibited to the extent necessary to protect the purposes underlying the
disqualification. 68
Specifically, with respect to access to public records, the court held that
"when an attorney is disqualified, successor counsel is presumptively enti-
tled to obtain the pleadings, discovery, correspondence and all other
61. Id. at 848.
62. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceed-
ing) (Hecht, J. dissenting) (supporting mandamus relief from trial court order granting new
trial without stating a reasoned basis for its ruling).
63. See In re Bayerische Motoren Werke, AG, 8 S.W.3d 326, 326 (Tex. 2000) (orig.
proceeding) (Hecht, J. dissenting).
64. No. 99-0772, 2000 WL 373920, *1 (Tex. April 13, 2000).
65. See In re EPIC Holdings, 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); Cf. Rubin
v. Enns, No. 07-99-0385-CV, 2000 WL 12900 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, Jan. 7, 2000, orig. pro-
ceeding) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of motion to disqualify firm that em-
ployed a legal assistant who had previously worked for relator's law firm based on
tripartite test).
66. See In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2000, orig. proceeding).
67. George, 28 S.W.3d at 512.
68. Id.
1100 [Vol. 54
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materials in the public record or exchanged by the parties. '69
With respect to work product, however, the court held that the succes-
sor firm's access to the former firm's work product must be restricted to
the extent necessary to protect the purpose of the disqualification. 70 In
fashioning a standard for determining the extent to which the new law
firm's access to work product should be restricted, the court rejected the
standards established by other jurisdictions in favor of its own test.71 The
court held that once a former client establishes that the two representa-
tions are substantially related, there is a "rebuttable presumption that the
work product contains confidential information. '72 To rebut the pre-
sumption, the current client must show that there is "not a substantial
likelihood that the desired items of work product contain or reflect confi-
dential information. ' 73
Because the current client must meet its burden without having access
to the work product, the court fashioned a specific procedure for review-
ing the work product.74 First, once "successor counsel moves for access
to the work product or the former client moves to restrict access, the trial
court should order the disqualified attorneys to produce an inventory of
work product ... describ[ing] the type of work, the subject matter, the
claims it relates to and any other factor the court considers relevant. '75
Although the court found that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting access to all work product, it noted that it established a new
standard regarding access to work product of disqualified counsel and
accordingly, denied the petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice
"to afford Relators an opportunity to reurge their motions to the trial
court in light of this opinion. '76
Justice Owen concurred in the court's conclusion that successor counsel
should not have blanket access to the former counsel's work product but
criticized the court's proposed standard for resolving the problem. 77 Spe-
cifically, Justice Owen noted that under the court's procedure the burden
falls on the parties who have no access to the work product.78
The dissent warned against the complexities of the test created by the
majority, arguing that "[b]ecause there is no practical way short of ban-
ning the transfer of work product to make sure the policies behind dis-
qualification are fulfilled" mandamus should be granted to prohibit
69. Id. at 514.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 516-17.




76. Id. at 520.




disclosure of any work pfoduct. 79
b. Injunctive Relief
Although mandamus will usually issue to resolve the question of domi-
nant jurisdiction between two district courts and decide which of conflict-
ing orders are controlling, mandamus is not available where the order in
question is a temporary injunction that is subject to immediate interlocu-
tory appeal.80
c. Orders for Sanctions
An order for the payment of sanctions is subject to mandamus relief
only where such sanctions threaten the party's willingness or ability to
continue the litigation.81
3. Untimely Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
In In re Wise,82 the Waco Court of Appeals denied a mandamus peti-
tion from a trial court order denying an individual free access to the court
record because the individual waited two years after the trial court's or-
der to file the mandamus petition without any explanation for the delay
in filing.83
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Appeal of Denial of Motion to Transfer Venue and Objection to
Attempted Joinder
Under Section 51.003(c) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code,
an interlocutory appeal is allowed from a trial court's decision "allowing
or denying... joinder" in cases where a party is "unable to independently
establish proper venue."' 84 As interpreted by the Waco Court of Appeals
in Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, if the trial court determines that each
joined plaintiff has independently established proper venue, Section
51.003(c) cannot be the jurisdictional basis for an appeal from the trial
court's denial of the defendants' challenge to venue and/or joinder.85
79. Id. at 526. (Brister, J., assigned, dissenting). Justice Brister was joined in the dis-
sent by Justices Hecht and Ramey (assigned). Justices Enoch, Hankinson and Gonzalez all
recused themselves from the decision in this case.
80. See In re Gorman, 1 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, orig. proceeding).
81. See In re Onstad, 20 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000) (orig.
proceeding).
82. 20 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 895.
84. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c).
85. 999 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999), affd, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000).
After the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the Waco court's analysis of
the jurisdiction issue. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000). The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Adams, 22 S.W.3d 121 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. filed) concurred with the Waco court's analysis of the statute,
concluding that an interlocutory appeal is available only from the trial court's determina-
tion whether joinder is proper based on the four joinder factors under section 15.003(a) of
1102 [Vol. 54
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The dissent in American Home disagreed, rejecting the argument that
the court of appeals only has jurisdiction if it is first determined by the
trial court that the party seeking joinder is unable to independently estab-
lish proper venue.86 According to the dissent, the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to review the determination of whether each party seeking
joinder is able to independently establish proper venue because the court
of appeals has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction.87
2. Appeal of Denial of Motion to Transfer Venue Based on Newly
Joined Defendant
Does section 15.003 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code ap-
ply to situations involving multiple defendants? This was the question the
Amarillo Court of Appeals faced in Labrador Oil Co. v. Norton Drilling
Co.,88 where the defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of its
motion to transfer venue based on the plaintiff's addition of a new defen-
dant where, according to the original defendant, there was no basis in law
or in the record to allow or permit a joinder of the claims against the
original defendant and the newly added defendant.8 9 The court of ap-
peals construed section 15.003 as a whole and concluded that the section
deals only with situations in which there are multiple plaintiffs, and sub-
section (c) only permits an interlocutory appeal from decisions of the trial
court with regard to whether or not additional plaintiffs correctly belong
in the lawsuit. 90 Accordingly, it is only in such instances that the statute
permits a defendant an interlocutory appeal.91
3. Appeal of Order Permitting Pre-Suit Discovery
Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits a person to
petition the court for an order authorizing the taking of an oral or written
deposition to either (1) perpetuate testimony for use in an anticipated
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code and that an interlocutory appeal is not available
from the trial court's determination that a plaintiff can independently establish proper
venue apart from the four joinder factors. Id. at 123-24. In support of this conclusion, the
Fort Worth court quoted the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Surgitek v. Abel, 997
S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) that an interlocutory appeal under section 15.003(c) is availa-
ble "[w]hen a trial court's order necessarily determines the propriety of a plaintiff's joinder
under section 15.003(a)." Id. By its express terms, the Fort Worth court concluded, section
15.003(c) only provides an appeal from the trial court's joinder determination as to plain-
tiffs who are "unable to independently establish proper venue." Id. (quoting TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)).
86. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 999 S.W.2d at 911-12 (Gray, J., dissenting).
87. Id. The supreme court expressly rejected this argument, holding that "[n]either
the court of appeals nor this Court can review the propriety of the trial court's venue
decision." Am. Home, 38 S.W.3d at 96.
88. 10 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
89. Id. at 717-18.
90. Id. at 719.
91. Id. at 720. The court of appeals determined that the intent of the legislature in
enacting section 15.003 was to restrict the joinder of multiple plaintiffs, particularly in tort
cases, in order to prevent forum shopping by multiple plaintiffs. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Goldston, 957 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied)).
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suit, or (2) to investigate a potential claim or suit.92 As a general rule,
any order relating to discovery in aid of a pending or contemplated cause,
even when filed in a separate action, are considered interlocutory and are
not appealable except in connection with an appeal from the final disposi-
tion of the main cause on the merits.93 The finality of such an order, for
purposes of appeal, depends on the context in which the order is en-
tered. 94 The rule relating to such orders is that when a pre-trial discovery
order is ancillary to or essentially a part of another suit, whether ongoing
or contemplated, the bill is an interlocutory order and not appealable. 95
When the discovery order is a separate suit having as its sole object the
obtaining of the information requested, the order granting discovery is
final for appeal. 96 The question is whether an order for pre-suit discovery
should be treated as a discovery order or as a separate lawsuit.97
Addressing these issues in Valley Baptist, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals concluded that a direct appeal from a pre-suit discovery order
should be limited to situations where the discovery order sought is clearly
a separate action against a third party. 98 This is so because, when the
discovery is directed against third parties against whom suit is not pend-
ing and not contemplated, the discovery order resolves all discovery is-
sues between the requested discovery and the discovery defendant. "It is
an end in itself and becomes a final and appealable judgment against the
discovery defendant." 99
4. Appeal of Order Denying Summary Judgment Based on Assertion
of Immunity
Under section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, "a
person" may appeal from an interlocutory order "that denies a motion
for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an
individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivi-
sion of the state."100 The Texas Supreme Court recently held that this
applies to the denial of a motion for summary judgment that merely as-
serts immunity as a defense-even if the defendant wholly fails to present
92. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.1.
93. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Corpus





98. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d at 676-77.
99. Id. at 677 (adopting the analysis of Jacintoport Corp. v. Almanza, 987 S.W.2d 901,
902 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). After the Survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and opinion because the party pre-
viously resisting the presuit discovery complied with the discovery order, rendering the
court of appeals' decision an impermissible advisory opinion. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v.
Gonzalez, 33 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000).
100. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5).
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evidence in support of his affirmative defense of immunity. 10 1 Regardless
of whether or not the motion was properly denied because it was not
supported by evidence, a motion that is "based on an assertion of immu-
nity" is an interlocutory order over which the court of appeals has juris-
diction to consider whether the trial court erred in denying the motion.10 2
5. Appeal of Order Denying Confirmation of Arbitration Award
Under section 171.098(a)(5) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code, a party may appeal an order confirming or denying confirmation of
an arbitration award or vacating an award without directing a rehear-
ing.10 3 The question of first impression before the Fourteenth Court of
Appeals in Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Vondergoltz10 4 was whether a trial
court's order denying confirmation of an arbitration award was appeala-
ble when the order also granted the application to vacate the award and
ordered rehearing before a new arbitration panel.'0 5 Determining that
an order denying confirmation of an arbitration award is the functional
equivalent of an order vacating an award, the Houston court concluded
that, construed logically, the statute does not permit an appeal from or-
ders denying confirmation or vacating an award where rehearing is di-
rected as to either. 0 6
101. Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. of Dallas v. Margulis, 11 S.W.3d 186, 187-
88 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
102. Id. at 188. Interestingly, the supreme court made a point of noting that, although
only two of the four defendants had moved for summary judgment, all defendants filed a
notice of appeal from the trial court's interlocutory ruling denying the summary judgment.
Id. at 187. Section 51.014 provides that "a person" may appeal an interlocutory order
denying summary judgment based on an assertion of immunity. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5).
103. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(3), (5).
104. 14 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
105. Id. at 330.
106. Id. at 331. The First Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Stolhandske
v. Stern, 14 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), where the trial
court made no ruling on a motion to confirm the arbitration award but vacated the award
and ordered a new arbitration. Id. at 813. Concluding that it had no jurisdiction over the
appeal, the Stolhandske court reasoned that, while subsection (5) of the Texas Arbitration
Act provides for an interlocutory appeal of an order "vacating an award without directing
a rehearing," that grant of interlocutory review is limited to cases in which the trial court
fails to order a rehearing. Id. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(5).
Under the rule of statutory construction that a statute's inclusion of a specific limitation
excludes all others, the limitation express in subsection (5) excludes review of cases in
which the trial court vacates an arbitration award, but does, in fact, order a new arbitra-
tion. Stolhandske, 14 S.W.3d at 813. The Stolhandske court also rejected the appellant's
argument that the trial court's order vacating the arbitration award constituted an implicit
denial of his motion to confirm the award, which would be an appealable interlocutory
order under subsection (3) of the Texas Arbitration Act. Id. at 813-14. TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(3). The court concluded that such a construction of subsec-
tion (3) would render subsection (5) meaningless because all orders vacating awards would
be appealable under subsection (3), with or without an order for rehearing, and the limita-
tion in subsection (5) would cease to be effective. Stolhandske, 14 S.W.3d at 814. The




6. Appeal of Order Granting Temporary Injunction
An interlocutory order granting or refusing to grant a temporary in-
junction is appealable.10 7 The issue is whether the order appealed consti-
tutes a "temporary injunction." As noted by the First Court of Appeals
in Swanson v. Community State Bank,10 8 "[a]n injunction is a coercive
order that is equitable in nature .... [Its] purpose ... is to maintain the
status quo pending trial on the merits."'1 9 Where, as in Swanson, the
order complained of is permissive in nature, the order is not the
equivalent of a temporary injunction, and is not appealable." 0
7. Appeal of Probate Order
Under the Texas Probate Code, "[a]ll final orders of any court exercis-
ing original probate jurisdiction shall be appealable to the courts of ap-
peals.""'  To be final and appealable, a probate order need not fully
dispose of the entire proceeding. 1' 2 The test for appealability is "if there
is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be consid-
ered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise
issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocu-
tory. ' 113 Where, as in Estate of Navar, the order at issue is part of a
portion of the estate's administration dealing with satisfying creditor's
claims, and nothing in the record indicates that such claims have been
fully disposed of and no severance has been made, the order is not final
and appealable. 114
8. Appeal of Denial of Summary Judgment
As a general rule, the denial of summary judgment is interlocutory and
not appealable. However, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed in Baker
Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc.115 its holding in Cincinnati Life Ins. Co.
v. Cates" 6 that this rule does not apply when a movant seeks summary
107. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4).
108. 12 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
109. Id. at 164.
110. Id. at 165-66. The order in Swanson stated that a certain number of shares of stock
were to be sold by the appellee bank and the proceeds applied to the appellants' debt owed
to the bank. Regardless of the word "ordered," however, the court of appeals held that the
order was permissive in nature-and, therefore, not a temporary injunction-because, af-
ter the order was entered, the bank could have chosen not to liquidate the stock. Id. at
166.
111. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(f) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
112. Estate of Navar v. Fitzgerald, 14 S.W.3d 378, 379 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no
pet.) (citing Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. 1995)). As explained by the
El Paso court in Estate of Navar, this is so because probate administration is a continuing
process and its nature contemplates that future decisions must be based on intermediate
decisions. 14 S.W.3d at 379. Interlocutory appeals are necessary to provide practical re-
view of erroneous, controlling intermediate decisions before their consequences become
irreparable. Id.
113. Estate of Navar, 14 S.W.3d at 379 (quoting Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 783).
114. Id. at 380.
115. 12 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 1999).
116. 927 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1996).
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judgment on multiple grounds, and the trial court grants the motion on
one or more grounds but denies the motion or fails to rule on one or
more other grounds presented in the motion and urged on appeal.1 17 On
appeal from a summary judgment, the court of appeals must review "all
of the summary judgment grounds on which the trial court actually ruled,
whether granted or denied, and which are dispositive of the appeal, and
may consider any grounds on which the trial court did not rule."' 18
9. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Appeals
Ordinarily, the Texas Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to re-
view a court of appeals' decision on an interlocutory appeal unless there
is a dissent in the court of appeals, conflicts jurisdiction, or a specific stat-
ute granting jurisdiction.119 However, even when an appeal is interlocu-
tory, the supreme court has jurisdiction "to determine whether the court
of appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal.'1 20
With respect to conflicts jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal, the
Texas Supreme Court in Southwestern Ref Co. v. Bernal' 21 recently ana-
lyzed what it takes to demonstrate a conflict in the law sufficient to in-
voke the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Southwestern Refining
involved an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order certifying a class
action.122 The order directed that the class proceed in multiple phases,
with evidence relating to punitive damages, including the defendants' net
worth, to be introduced before the jury would be asked to decide causa-
tion and actual damages for the nonrepresentative members of the
class.12 3 After an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to the court of ap-
peals, the defendants sought review by the supreme court, arguing that
the court of appeals' approval of the multi-phase trial plan directed by
the certification order conflicted with the supreme court's dictate in
Transportation Ins. Co. v Moriel'24 that, upon a party's request, a trial
court must bifurcate the trial and obtain jury findings on liability and ac-
tual damages before allowing evidence-including evidence of a defen-
dant's net worth-on the amount of punitive damages.' 25
Analyzing its jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, the supreme
court noted that it "has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals when the
117. Baker, 12 S.W.3d at 5 (citing Cincinnati Life, 927 S.W.2d at 624-26).
118. Id. (citations omitted). This is so regardless of the number of summary judgment
motions filed, when they were presented to the trial court, or when the trial court ruled.
Id.
119. University of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. of Dallas v. Margulis, 11 S.W.3d 186,
187 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).
120. Id. See also Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000) ("Al-
though jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is generally final in the court of appeals, this
Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the court of appeals properly determined its
own jurisdiction.").
121. 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000).
122. Id. at 428.
123. Id. at 430.
124. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
125. Southwestern Ref, 22 S.W.3d at 430.
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court of appeals' decision conflicts with a prior decision of another court
of appeals or this Court on a question of law material to the decision of
the case."1t 26 The standard for conflicts jurisdiction "is whether the rul-
ings in two cases are so far upon the same state of facts that the decision
of one case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other."'127 The
Court emphasized that conflicts jurisdiction does not "require that the
two cases be identical either on the facts underlying the causes of action
nor on the procedural facts. ' 128 The key issue is whether the ruling in
one case is necessarily conclusive in the other on a question of law mate-
rial to the decision in the case. 129
Because the Court in Moriel said that the standards articulated therein
"apply to all punitive damage cases tried in the future" without excepting
class actions, the supreme court determined, in Southwestern Refining,
that conflicts jurisdiction existed because "[i]f Moriel is good law, the
court of appeals' holding cannot be sustained.' 30 The Court further
pointed out that once a conflict confers jurisdiction on the Court, the case
is before the Court for all purposes. 31
Also during the Survey period, the supreme court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the provision of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code
enacted in 1997 that confers jurisdiction on the supreme court to review
interlocutory orders granting or denying class certification in motor vehi-
cle licensee cases, even in the absence of a conflict or dissent. 132 In Ford
Motor, the supreme court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Motor
Code's provision vesting the supreme court with jurisdiction is unconsti-
tutional because it violates the prohibition against special laws, denies
equal protection of the laws, and has an insufficient title.133 The Court
ultimately concluded that it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal
under the Motor Code's provision without considering whether jurisdic-
tion existed under Texas Government Code Section 22.001(a)(2). 134
II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
With one exception, the decisions handed down during this Survey pe-
riod involved strict enforcement of preservation rules.
In several instances, the Texas Supreme Court found waiver. With re-
gard to charge error, the supreme court reaffirmed the rule that a party
who properly objects to the charge in the trial court may nevertheless
waive that objection by failing to raise the issue on appeal. 135 With re-
126. Id. at 430-31.
127. Id. at 430 (citing Coastal Corp. v. Garza, 979 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1998)).
128. Id. at 431.
129. Id.
130. Southwestern Ref., 22 S.W.3d at 432.
131. Id.
132. Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2000). See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ART. 4413(36), § 6.06(g) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
133. Ford Motor, 22 S.W.3d at 451-52.
134. Id. at 452.
135. See In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343-44 (Tex. 2000); TEX. R. APP. P. 278-79.
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gard to defects or omissions in the pleadings, the Supreme Court strictly
applied the rule that a party waives its objection to pleading deficiencies
by failing to object before submission of the charge to the jury.136 With
regard to the trial court's failure to obtain a jury finding on all issues, the
supreme court held that by failing to object when the jury did not return
an answer in the charge, a party "waived any benefit from the jury ques-
tion, waived any right to have the trial judge supply his own factfinding or
grant a new trial on the issue, and waived his right to appeal a judgment
on the issue."'1 37
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals also found waiver in United
Parcel Serv. v. Tasdemiroglu.138 The court held that an appellant seeking
to bring a no evidence or a matter of law point of error does not preserve
that issue by obtaining an order denying its motion for summary judg-
ment. As a general rule, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not appealable. 139 If the case is ultimately tried on the merits, the party
must again raise the legal issue by filing a motion for directed verdict, a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion to disregard a
jury finding, a motion for new trial, or by objecting to the charge. 140
Moreover, the denial of summary judgment against one party does not
operate as an "effective" grant of summary judgment for the other
party. 141 Thus, appellant cannot avoid waiver by construing its appeal as
an appeal from a fictitious grant of summary judgment in favor of its
opponent. a42
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a party waived its complaint
when the party waited until one day after a witness testified at trial until
moving to strike the testimony for discovery abuse. In Aluminum Chems.
(Bolivia), Inc. v. Bechtel Corp.,a43 appellant argued that the trial court
erred by failing to strike the testimony of an opposing witness in light of
appellee's failure to supplement interrogatory responses. 144 However,
when the witness testified, appellant failed to object, and, indeed, cross
examined the witness at length.145
The court acknowledged that most motion to strike cases deal with pre-
trial testimony, not testimony at trial. Consequently, the court had never
before addressed the issue of the effect of a one-day delay before filing a
136. See City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex. 2000); TEX. R. Civ. P.
274; TEX. R. App. P. 33.1.
137. Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 56 (Tex. 2000) (citing Fleet v. Fleet, 711 S.W.2d 1
(Tex. 1986) (holding that a trial court will not be reversed for rendering judgment on an
incomplete verdict unless the party who would benefit from answers to the unanswered
issues objects to the incomplete verdict before the jury is discharged)).
138. 25 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, rule 53.7(f) motion
filed Sept. 21, 2000).
139. Id. at 916 (citing Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1966)).
140. Id. (citing Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991)).
141. Id. at 917.
142. Id.





motion to strike. The court concluded that, because it had "found no
instance where a claim of error is preserved when a party waits until the
witness completes her testimony, without objection, and then asks the
court on the next day to strike the testimony[,] [t]he claim of error has
not been preserved for appellate review.' 46
The one exception to the emergence of cases strictly construing preser-
vation rules is the supreme court's decision in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
Minco Oil & Gas Co.147 In that case, the trial court found a release pro-
vision in an agreement to be ambiguous, but never resolved the ambigu-
ity because it found the agreement to be unconscionable. 148 Because the
appellant failed to object to the ambiguity finding, the court of appeals
found waiver on the release issue.149 The supreme court disagreed, hold-
ing that the trial court's controlling conclusion of unconscionability ren-
dered the ambiguity finding unnecessary to its judgment, and the failure
to specifically challenge the finding therefore did not constitute waiver.150
Finally, this Survey period saw the development of a split among courts
of appeals regarding the scope of the 1997 amendment to Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33.1. Rule 33.1 does not require that a party obtain
a written ruling from the trial court in order to preserve an issue for ap-
peal. Indeed, Rule 33.1 "relaxes the former requirement of an express
ruling and codifies case law that recognized implied rulings."' 5' Thus, a
trial court's order granting defendants' motion to disregard certain jury
findings constitutes an implicit denial of the plaintiffs' motion for judg-
ment on those findings.' 52
However, appellate courts disagree about whether a trial court's ruling
on a party's motion for summary judgment impliedly disposes of objec-
tions to summary judgment evidence.' 53
146. Id.
147. 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 1999).
148. See id. at 315.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 316.
151. Frazier v. Yu, 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
Even so, a docket sheet notation does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 33.1. See Guyot
v. Guyot, 3 S.W.3d 243, 246-47 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, rule 53.7(f) motion filed Nov.
22, 1999) (docket sheet notation reflecting appellant's pre-judgment desire to withdraw
consent to agreed decree of divorce could not be relied on to preserve error).
152. See Salinas v. Rafati, 948 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. 1997).
153. Compare Frazier, 987 S.W.2d at 610 (trial court impliedly sustained defendant's
objections when it granted summary judgment for defendant), Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v.
Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484, 493 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) and Blum v.
Julian, 977 S.W.2d 819, 823-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (trial court implicitly
overruled plaintiff's objections when it granted summary judgment for defendant) with
Well Solutions, Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet.
denied) (rejecting the Fort Worth court of appeals' findings of implicit rulings because
rulings on summary judgment motions and objections to summary judgment proof are not
alternatives).
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III. JUDGMENTS
The Survey period brought yet another onslaught of cases reflecting
the struggle among the Texas courts of appeals to determine when a judg-
ment rendered without a conventional trial on the merits is final for pur-
poses of appeal in light of the supreme court's decisions in Mafrige v.
Ross154 and Inglish v. Union State Bank.155 Under Mafrige and Inglish,
"the intent of the trial court is not the controlling consideration in deter-
mining whether a judgment is final .... Rather, if a judgment contains
language purporting to grant or deny relief that disposes of all claims or
parties, regardless of the intent of the parties or the trial court, that judg-
ment is final as to all claims and all parties."'1 56 However, prior to this
article going to print, the Texas Supreme Court issued Lehmann v. Har-
Con Corp.,157 and did away with its previous stance that a Mother Hub-
bard clause indicates finality for purposes of appeal.
In Lehmann, the Court held that:
in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be ren-
dered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for pur-
poses of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims
and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it
states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all
claims and all parties. 158
In reaching this holding, the supreme court stated that it no longer be-
lieved "that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued
without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality," and overruled
Mafrige to the extent it states otherwise. 159 The Court reasoned that, in
an order on an interlocutory motion like a motion for partial summary
judgment, language to the effect that "all relief not granted is denied" is
ambiguous because it may mean only the relief requested in the motion
(not all the relief requested by anyone in the case) and not granted by the
order is denied. 160 The Court even acknowledged that a Mother Hub-
bard clause may have no intended meaning at all, "having been inserted
for no other reason than that it appears in a form book or resides on a
154. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
155. 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997). Cases issued during the Survey period reflecting this
struggle include: Harris County v. Nash, 22 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, rule 53.7(f) motion filed Sept. 6, 2000)); John v. Marshall Health Serv., Inc., 12
S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, rule 53.7(f) motion filed Apr. 3, 2000)); Kistler v.
Stran, 22 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, rule 53.7(f) motion filed July
28, 2000); Curtis v. Ziff Energy Group, Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Scott v. Poindexter, No. 04-98-00101-CV, 2000 WL 4540 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Postive Feed, Inc. v. Guthmann, 4 S.W.3d 879 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Guajardo v. Conwell, 30 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. filed).
156. Nash, 22 S.W.3d at 49.
157. 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).
158. Id. at 192-93.
159. Id. at 192.
160. Id. at 203-04.
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word processor.' 16' The Court concluded that the standard Mother Hub-
bard clause is used in interlocutory orders so frequently "that it cannot be
taken as any indication of finality."'1 62
Instead, to be final, an order of judgment must actually dispose of
every pending claim and party or clearly and unequivocally state that it
finally disposes of all claims and all parties. 163 There must be some "clear
indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of
the entire case."1 64 "Language that the plaintiff take nothing by his
claims in the case, or that the case is dismissed, shows finality if there are
no other claims by other parties; but language that 'plaintiff take nothing
by his claims against X' when there is more than one defendant or other
parties in the case does not indicate finality. '165
In Lehmann, the supreme court also emphasized that, "[an order must
be read in light of the importance of preserving a party's right to ap-
peal."'1 66 Accordingly, if the court of appeals "is uncertain about the in-
tent of the order, it can abate the appeal to permit clarification by the
trial court."' 67 However, the Court concluded, if the order is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given effect even if one or more parties did not
intend for the judgment to be final.' 68 "An express adjudication of all
parties and claims in a case is not interlocutory merely because the record
does not afford a legal basis for the adjudication. In those circumstances,
the order must be appealed and reversed."' 69
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Accordingly, "[a]n order that adjudicates only the
plaintiff's claims against the defendant does not adjudicate a counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third party claim, nor does an order adjudicating claims like the latter dispose of the plain-
tiff's claims. An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against
one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. An
order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled 'final,' or
because the word 'final' appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards costs.
Nor does an order completely dispose of a case merely because it states that it is appeala-
ble, since even interlocutory orders may sometimes be appealable." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. To make the finality determination, the court of appeals may need to look to
the record in the case, because the record may reveal whether an order is made final by its
own language. Id. at 205-06.
166. Id. at 206.
167. Id. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 27.2. See Wilson v. Lott, No. 07-99-0484-CV, 2000 WL
1285421, *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Aug. 31, 2000, no pet.) (abating appeal and remanding
for the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether a final judgment had been
rendered).
168. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206.
169. Id. The supreme court's holding in Lehmann will likely all but eliminate the occur-
rence of appellate court review of interlocutory partial summary judgments-a procedure
that has emerged over the past few years as a result of the appealability of partial summary
judgments rendered final for appeal pursuant to a Mother Hubbard clause resulting in an
judgment that grants more relief than requested. See Postive Feed, Inc. v. Guthmann, 4
S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist. 1999, no pet.) (when a trial court grants
more relief by summary judgment than requested by disposing of issues never presented to
it, the court of appeals reverses and remands as to those issues, but addresses the merits of
the properly presented claims); Curtis v. Ziff Energy Group, Ltd., 12 S.W.3d 114, 1.19-20
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (same). Under Lehmann, claims and
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IV. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A. POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS SEEKING A SUBSTANTIVE
CHANGE IN THE JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court and courts of appeals continue their trend of
placing substance over form when it comes to the type of document that
needs to be filed to extend the trial court's plenary jurisdiction and the
appellate timetable. For example, in Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith
Southern Equip., Inc.,170 the supreme court concluded that a motion filed
within 30 days of an existing judgment that seeks to add an award of
sanctions to the judgment qualifies as a motion to modify, correct, or re-
form a judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(g), thus ex-
tending the trial court's plenary jurisdiction and appellate timetable. 171
The Court rejected the appellee's argument that a motion requesting
sanctions after judgment is entered should not be construed as a Rule
329b(g) motion to modify because a sanctions motion concerns matters
that are distinct from the substantive issues in the case. 172 The supreme
court held that a motion made after judgment to incorporate a sanction
as part of the final judgment does propose a change to that judgment.
Accordingly, such a motion is, "on its face, a motion to modify, correct or
reform the existing judgment within the meaning of Rule 329b(g)."'173
The supreme court concluded that a timely filed post-judgment motion
that seeks a substantive change in an existing judgment qualifies as a mo-
tion to modify under Rule 329b(g) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
thus extending the trial court's plenary jurisdiction and the appellate
timetable.174
parties not addressed by the movant in his or her motion for summary judgment are not
summarily disposed of pursuant to the presence of a Mother Hubbard clause in the order.
Only if the trial court clearly states that it is disposing of all parties and claims will the
order be final for purposes of appeal (and, if the order renders more relief than requested,
presumably the same procedure on appeal will apply, to-wit: the interests of judicial econ-
omy will demand that the court of appeals reverse and remand as to the issues never prop-
erly presented, but address the merits of the properly presented claims). See Bandera
Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tex. 1997).
170. 10 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2000).
171. Id. at 313.
172. Id. at 311-12.
173. Id. at 312.
174. Id. at 313. In its analysis, the Court carefully distinguished between the language
of Rule 329b(h)-"[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect,"
which pinpoints the time from which the appellate timetable runs, from the language of
Rule 329b(g)-"[a] motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment," which describes the
type of motion required to extend the trial court's plenary power and the appellate dead-
lines. Id. The Court concluded that "[s]ubpart (g)'s omission of the 'in any respect' lan-
guage found in subpart (h) and its pointed distinction between motions to modify and
motions seeking purely clerical corrections indicate that the respective provisions have dif-
ferent triggers. Thus, any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains
plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h) .... but only a
motion seeking a substantive change will extend the appellate deadlines and the court's
plenary power under Rule 329b(g)." Id. Stated another way, a judgment nunc pro tunc
that is entered to merely correct a clerical error will operate to restart the appellate timeta-
ble under Rule 329b(h), but a postjudgment motion for judgment nunc pro tunc will not
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Notably, a motion filed by the appellant seeking sanctions for the ap-
pellees' refusal to comply with the judgment is distinguishable from the
type of sanctions motion the supreme court held in Lane Bank extends
appellate deadlines.' 75  Such a motion does not seek to alter the judg-
ment but instead seeks sanctions for the failure to comply with the judg-
ment and, therefore, does not extend appellate deadlines.' 76
The First Court of Appeals in Finley v. J.C. Pace Ltd.177 similarly
looked to the substance rather than the caption or introduction of the
appellant's "motion for rehearing" to determine whether the appellate
deadlines had been extended. The court of appeals concluded that, in
substance, the motion for rehearing qualified as a motion for new trial
because it sought to set aside the summary judgment that disposed of the
case and, if it had been granted, a trial would have resulted.178
B. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE
During the Survey period, the First Court of Appeals in Finley v. J.C.
Pace Ltd.179 addressed an issue left unresolved by the supreme court in
Tate v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & C.'180 : whether the appellate timeta-
ble is extended if the filing fee for the motion for new trial is paid after
the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction.' 8' Relying on the supreme
court's dictate that the rules of procedure be construed "reasonably but
liberally, when possible, so that the right to appeal is not lost by creating
a requirement not absolutely necessary from the literal words of the
rule," 82 the court in Finley held that a timely tendered motion for new
trial extends the appellate timetable regardless of when the filing fee is
paid (even if the trial court's plenary jurisdiction has long expired and the
case is pending on appeal).' 83
C. LATE NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Straitway Transp., Inc. v.
Mundorfl84 addressed the issue of the timeliness of appeal in the face of
late notice of judgment. In that case, the trial court made a fact finding
that the appellant did not receive actual notice of its December 5 judg-
qualify under Rule 329b(g) and will not extend the appellate deadlines and the trial court's
plenary power. Id. at 313-14.
175. Guajardo v. Conwell, 30 S.W.3d 15, 16 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
filed).
176. Id.
177. 4 S.W.3d 319, 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
178. Id. at 320.
179. Id. at 319.
180. 934 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1996).
181. Tate, 934 S.W.2d at 84 n.l.
182. Finley, 4 S.W.2d at 321 (quoting Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex.
1993).
183. Id. at 321. The Finley court then ordered the appellant to pay the filing fee within
15 days of the date of its opinion. Id.
184. 6 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
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ment until January 6, but then denied the appellant's motion to restart
appellate deadlines. 185 Ignoring the trial court's conclusion that appellate
deadlines began on the date of judgment, the court of appeals affirmed
that, under Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party
opposing the judgment claims to have failed to receive either notice from
the clerk or actual notice of the judgment more than 20 but less than 90
days from the date of judgment, he must seek a fact finding from the trial
court on the earliest day he received notice.186 Then, the trial court must
enter a finding that the party did or did not prove that date and, if he did,
the appellate timetable automatically restarts.187
D. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL IN MENTAL HEALTH CONTEXT
Must a person appealing from a temporary mental health commitment
order comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 324's motion-for-new-
trial requirement in order to complain about factual insufficiency on ap-
peal? This was the issue facing the Texas Supreme Court in Johnstone v.
State of Texas.188 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply generally to
mental health commitment proceedings, and, to preserve factual insuffi-
ciency error, Rule 324 of those rules requires that a motion for new trial
be filed within 30 days from the date of judgment.189 However, section
574.070 of the Texas Health and Safety Code requires a proposed mental
health patient to file a notice of appeal 10 days after the trial court signs
the commitment order and does not contemplate the filing of a motion
for new trial.190 Accordingly, Rule 324 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and section 574.070 conflict.19' When a rule of procedure conflicts
with a statute, the statute prevails unless the rule has been passed subse-
quent to the statute and repeals the statute as provided by Texas Govern-
ment Code section 22.004.192 Because the mental health statutory
scheme supersedes the appellate timetable established by Rule 324 in
conjunction with Rule 329b and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1,
the supreme court in Johnstone concluded that "a person appealing a
temporary mental commitment order need not file a motion for new trial
as a prerequisite to challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence" on
appeal.' 93
185. Id. at 737.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 22 S.W.3d 408, 409 (Tex. 2000).
189. Id. at 410; TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(2).
190. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.070 (Vernon 1992). See Johnstone, 22
S.W.3d at 410. The Health & Safety Code provisions governing appeals from orders re-
quiring court-ordered mental health services reflect an intention by the Legislature for
appeals from commitment orders to proceed expeditiously because the orders result in
confinement. See id.
191. See Johnstone, 22 S.W.3d at 410.
192. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (Vernon 1988). See Johnstone, 22 S.W.3d at 409.
193. Johnstone, 22 S.W.3d at 411.
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E. WITHDRAWAL OR "UNGRANT" OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
"If a party withdraws a motion for new trial, the period of time for the
trial court's plenary power reverts back to thirty days from the date the
judgment is signed.' 94 An oral motion to modify the judgment made in
open court after the 30-day period does not change this fact, even if the
trial court grants the motion to modify on the record.195 Not only is the
oral motion improper under Rule 329b(g), it is untimely filed. Accord-
ingly, regardless of the relief the trial court clearly tries to grant, it has no
effect. Once the motion for new trial is withdrawn, which is effective
immediately, the trial court has no jurisdiction to modify or amend the
judgment. 196
Further, if a trial court is going to "ungrant" a previously granted mo-
tion for new trial, it must do so within 75 days of judgment. In Ferguson
v. Globe-Texas Co.,197 the judgment was entered February 8, 2000, and a
motion for new trial was timely filed on March 3, 2000. The trial court
granted the motion for new trial on April 20, 2000 (which was before the
75th day after judgment when the motion would otherwise have been
overruled by operation of law). Then, on May 19, 2000, well past 75 days
after judgment, but still within 105 days after judgment, the trial court
"ungranted" the motion for new trial.198
On appeal from the trial court's "ungrant" of the motion for new trial,
the Amarillo court held that it had no jurisdiction over the matter be-
cause the trial court's "ungrant" occurred after its power for doing so had
expired. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals held that a trial
court may only vacate an order granting a new trial during the period
when it continues to have plenary power, which, according to the court,
continues in effect for only 75 days after the date the judgment is signed
unless the exceptions provided for in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
329b(e) apply.199
The Ferguson court reasoned that, by its express terms, Rule 329b(e)
applied to the granting of a new trial, or the vacation, modification, cor-
rection, or reformation of a judgment after a motion for new trial was
previously overruled. It does not apply to the "ungranting" of a new trial
motion.200
194. In re Dilley Indep. Sch. Dist., 23 S.W.3d 189, 191 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000,
no pet.). TEX. R. Ov. P. 329b.
195. Dilley Indep. Sch. Dist., 23 S.W.3d at 191.
196. Id. at 191-92.
197. 35 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. filed).
198. Id. at 690.
199. Id. at 690-96. Rule 329b(e) provides:
If a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court, regardless
of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new
trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days
after all such timely-filed motions are overruled, either by a written and
signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
200. Ferguson, 35 S.W.3d at 691. The court of appeals also pointed out that this appli-
cation of the rules is consistent with the conclusions reached by the majority of the Texas
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The court of appeals in Ferguson rejected the argument that Rule
329b(e) need not specifically state that the trial court may "ungrant" a
motion for new trial during the 30-day extension period provided by the
rule for the trial court to have power to do so because, once the trial
court grants a new trial motion, the court invests itself with full authority
over the case until a final judgment is entered. Because this is true, the
trial court may at any time "ungrant" its previous grant of the new trial
motion. The Ferguson court acknowledged the logic of this argument, but
believed that the better reasoning is to interpret Rule 329b(e) according
to its plain meaning.20 1
V. SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT
In order to stay enforcement of a monetary judgment pending appeal,
appellate rule 24.2(a) requires appellant to post security in at least the
amount of the judgment plus estimated interest and costs. 20 2 However,
courts can order a lesser amount of security if the appellant establishes
that: (1) posting security for the full amount of the judgment would cause
irreparable harm to the judgment debtor, and (2) failing to post the full
bond will not substantially harm the judgment creditor. 20 3
In McDill Columbus Corp. v. Univ. Woods Apartments, Inc., the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to reduce the amount of the
bond because appellant failed to show that it would be irreparably
harmed if forced to post bond in the full amount of the judgment. 2°4 In
that case, the trial court found appellants to be jointly and severally liable
for approximately $8 million, which the court noted was "not an astro-
nomically high judgment. '20 5 At the hearing on the motion, appellants
presented evidence that their liquidity was low, but the court held that
low liquidity was not enough to warrant a reduction. 20 6 The record
demonstrated that, "at least from a dollar valuation point of view, appel-
lants have sufficient assets to cover the amount of the judgment," so the
trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce the
bond.20 7
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue. Id. at 690 (citing In re Marriage of Wil-
burn, 18 S.W.3d 837, 843 n.3 (Tex. App.-Ty'ler 2000, no pet.); Hunter v. O'Neill, 854
S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. App. Dallas-1993, no writ); Homart Dev. Co. v. Blanton, 755
S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Smith v. Caney Creek
Estates Club, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals has disagreed with this position. See Biaza v. Simon, 879
S.W.2d 349, 357 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that trial
court has 105 days to "ungrant" a motion for new trial because plenary authority continues
until a final judgment is entered).
201. Ferguson, 35 S.W.3d at 691.
202. TEX. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(1).
203. Id. 24.2(b).
204. 7 S.W.3d 923, 926 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
205. Id. at 925-26.




Before an appellate court can review a trial court's discretion in order-
ing the amount of security, however, "the record must demonstrate that a
request was presented to the trial court to decide the sufficiency of the
bond and that the trial court made a ruling" on the request.20 8 In Hamil-
ton v. Hi-Plains Truck Brokers, Inc., the appellant petitioned the appel-
late court to increase the amount required to supersede the judgment
after it had filed its brief.20 9 The court of appeals overruled the appel-
lant's request because the record did not establish that a motion to in-
crease the amount of the supersedeas bond was presented to the trial
court or approved by the trial court clerk.210
VI. STANDING TO APPEAL
During the last Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court held that an
appellant who is not named as a party of record may nevertheless appeal
under the doctrine of virtual representation if it shows: "(1) it is bound by
the judgment; (2) privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the re-
cord; and (3) there is an identity of interest between appellant and a party
to the judgment."'21' In Gulistan Carpet, Inc. v. Porter,212 the appellate
court found the first and third elements to be lacking and dismissed an
appeal by a successor in interest to the party against whom judgment was
rendered.
Faced with an unusual standing issue, the appellate court in Tallyho
Plastics, Inc. v. Big M Constr. Co. 21 3 held that appellant had standing to
appeal negative jury findings against other parties. In that case, the plain-
tiff sued three defendants, alleging joint and several liability for damage
caused to its equipment during transport.2 14 The jury found only one of
the defendants (Big M) liable.215 The plaintiff did not appeal the findings
of zero liability against the remaining defendants, but Big M did, arguing
that the other two should share the liability. 216 On appeal, the remaining
defendants argued that, because the contribution statute did not apply,
and because Big M did not assert a cross claim against them, Big M did
not have standing.217 The court of appeals rejected that argument, hold-
ing that, because it could find no authority mandating that an appellant
may only appeal findings against itself, Big M had standing to appeal the
208. Hamilton v. Hi-Plains Truck Brokers, Inc., 23 S.W.3d 442, 443 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (citing Lowe v. Monsanto Co., 965 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1998, no pet.).
209. Id. at 442.
210. Id. at 443.
211. Motor Vehicle Bd. of the Texas Dept. of Transp. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers
Ass'n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 110 (Tex. 1999).
212. 4 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
213. 8 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.).
214. Id. at 791-92.
215. Id. at 792.
216. Id. at 791.
217. Id. at 794-95.
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VII. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. APPEALS FROM SMALL CLAIMS COURT
Under the Texas Government Code, an appeal from a small claims
court judgment to a county court is in a de novo proceeding, and the
judgment of the county court on appeal "is final.1219 Does this mean
there is no further appeal to the court of appeals from a judgment of the
county court after a trial de novo appeal from the small claims court?
Before 1998, the law was uniform that, despite the "is final" language of
the government code, "a judgment from a county court in a de novo ap-
peal from the small claims court could be appealed to the court of ap-
peals. ' 220 However, in 1998, the First Court of Appeals in Davis v.
Covert221 held that there is no appeal to the court of appeals from a judg-
ment of the county court after a trial de novo appeal from the small
claims court. 222 The Davis court reasoned that "final" means there is no
further appeal, regardless of the provision of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code giving a court of appeals jurisdiction over cases in which
the amount in controversy exceeds $100.223 The specific provisions of the
Texas Government Code, the court held, control over the more general
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 224
During the Survey period, the Waco, Houston Fourteenth, Corpus
Christi and Dallas Courts of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the Davis
court, agreeing that there can be no further appeal from a county court
judgment after an appeal through a trial de novo of a small claims court
judgment.225
B. APPEALS FROM JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT IN
CONCEALED HANDGUN CASES
Under the Concealed Handgun Act of the Texas Government Code, 226
an appeal from the justice of the peace is to the county court for trial de
218. Id. at 795.
219. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 28.053(b), (d) (Vernon 1988).
220. A-Rocket Moving & Storage v. Gardner, No. 14-99-01380-CV, 2000 WL 796058,
*1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, mand. denied) (citing Gaskill v. Sneaky Enters.,
Inc., 997 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied)).
221. 983 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
222. Id. at 303.
223. Id. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997).
224. Davis, 983 S.W.2d at 303.
225. A-Rocket, 2000 WL 796058 at *1; Lederman v. Rowe, 3 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1999, no pet.); Williamson v. A-1 Elec. Auto Serv., 28 S.W.3d 731, 731-32
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (per curiam); Howell Aviation Servs.
v. Aerial Ads, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 321, 323 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). "The legislature
could not have been more clear when it stated that such an appeal in the county court is
'final."' A-Rocket, 2000 WL 796058 at *1.
226. TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 411.174(a)(6), 411.183(b) (Vernon 1988).
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novo without a jury.227 May a party pursue a further appeal to the court
of appeals from a judgment of the county court after a trial de novo ap-
peal from the justice of the peace? The court of appeals in Texas Dep't of
Pub. Safety v. Tune Safety22 8 held that it had jurisdiction over such an
appeal because "there are no restrictions or regulations on [a party's] ap-
peal from the county court at law."'22 9 The supreme court agreed that the
court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal, but disagreed that there
are no restrictions or regulations on a party's ability to bring such an
appeal.230
Specifically, the supreme court noted that the court of appeals' jurisdic-
tion over any appeal must be based on either (1) the general constitu-
tional grant found in Article V, section 6 of the Texas Constitution, 231
subject to any restrictions or regulations imposed by the Legislature; or
(2) a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction. 232 Since the Handgun Act
does not contain a specific grant of jurisdiction to the courts of appeals,
the Court concluded that there is no specific statutory basis for jurisdic-
tion in the court of appeals. 233 The Court determined, however, that the
general constitutional grant of jurisdiction provides a basis for jurisdiction
subject to two statutes limiting that jurisdiction to causes in which the
amount in controversy or the judgment exceeds $100.234 The Court then
concluded that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal in
Tune because the $140 licensing fee for a concealed-handgun license es-
tablished the amount in controversy, which exceeded $100.235
C. APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURT IN
DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION CASES
There is a split among the Texas courts of appeals as to whether they
have jurisdiction over appeals from a license suspension appeal. Specifi-
cally, the Fort Worth, Corpus Christi and Beaumont courts of appeals
have concluded that the courts of appeals have general jurisdiction over
appeals from a license suspension appeal heard in a county court, county
court at law or district court. 236 The Houston Fourteenth and Waco
227. Id. § 411.180(e).
228. 977 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998), affd, 23 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. 2000).
229. Id. at 652.
230. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Tune, 23 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tex. 2000).
231. Under the constitution, the courts of appeals have general jurisdiction over all
cases "of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdic-
tion, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law." TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 6; see Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 361.
232. The Texas Constitution also vests courts of appeals with "such other jurisdiction,
original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6.
233. Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 361. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 411.180(e) (Vernon 1988).
234. Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 361; see TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.220(a); TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012 (Vernon 1986).
235. Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 361.
236. See Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Harris, 33 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2000, no pet. h.); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Pucek, 22 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Thompson, 14 S.W.3d 853, 854(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.).
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courts of appeals disagree, however, holding that the courts of appeals do
not have jurisdiction over such an appeal.237
Chapter 724 of the Texas Transportation Code provides that a person
who receives a notice of suspension of their driver's license from the
Texas Department of Public Safety may obtain a review of the suspension
before an administrative law judge.238 If the suspension is affirmed by
the judge, Chapter 524 of the code provides for an appeal of the license
suspension to the county court at law. 239 If there is no county court at
law in the county in which the person was arrested, then the decision may
be appealed to the county court. If the county judge is not a lawyer, then
the case must be transferred to the district court upon the motion of ei-
ther party or the judge.240 The transportation code further provides that
the Texas Department of Public Safety's right to an administrative appeal
is limited to issues of law.241 While the transportation code does not pro-
vide for further appeal from the initial appeal to county court, it expressly
states that the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") applies to appeals
from administrative license suspensions to the extent consistent with
Chapter 524.242
The APA grants a person who has exhausted their administrative reme-
dies and received a final decision in a contested case the right to judicial
review. 243 The APA, however, states that "[a] party may appeal a final
district court judgment under this chapter in the manner provided for
civil actions generally. '244 This language is the point of contention
among the courts of appeals because, read literally, a case heard in the
district court would be appealable, but one heard in the county court
would not.245 The courts of appeals finding jurisdiction over license sus-
pension appeals conclude that such an interpretation would not produce
the just and equitable result the legislature is presumed to have intended
in enacting the statute.246 The courts finding no jurisdiction over these
appeals point to the "plain language" of the pertinent statutes.247 Some
of these courts also rely on the fact that a Chapter 524 case does not
involve an amount in controversy. 248
237. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Callender, 14 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. filed); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Barlow, 992 S.W.2d 732, 741
(Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. granted).
238. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.041 (Vernon 1999).
239. Id. § 524.041.
240. Id. § 524.041(b).
241. Id. § 524.041(d).
242. Id. § 524.002(b).
243. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 1988).
244. Id. § 2001.901(a).
245. See Pucek, 22 S.W.3d at 66.
246. See, e.g., Harris, 33 S.W.3d at 408. See also Shirley v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety,
974 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
247. See Barlow, 992 S.W.2d at 739-40.
248. See, e.g., Callender, 14 S.W.3d at 324-25; Pucek, 22 S.W.3d at 66-67 (discussing this
issue, but finding jurisdiction over the license suspension appeal regardless of the amount
in controversy dispute); see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2 2 .2 2 0(a) (Vernon 1988); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012 (Vernon 1986).
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Significantly, in December 1999, the Texas Supreme Court exercised
jurisdiction over a license suspension appeal where the San Antonio
Court of Appeals had exercised appellate jurisdiction. 249 Although the
supreme court did not address the jurisdictional issue, the fact that it took
jurisdiction of the appeal has been noted by several of the intermediate
courts concluding they have jurisdiction over license suspension
appeals.250
VIII. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
A. WHEN IS A CASE "APPEALED"?
Upon completion of what act is a case considered appealed? The Texas
Supreme Court decided that issue during this Survey period in the con-
text of determining whether a law firm was entitled to an additional 5%
contingency fee under a contract that provided for the fee in the event
that the case was "appealed to a higher court."' 251 In Lopez, which was
governed by the old appellate rules, the case settled just twelve days after
the defendant filed a cash deposit in lieu of a cost bond.252 The plaintiffs
sued their law firm for, inter alia, breach of contract, arguing that "ap-
pealed to a higher court" means something more than initiating the ap-
pellate process by filing a cash deposit in lieu of a cost bond.
253
The supreme court rejected that argument as unworkable, holding that,
according to the plain language of old appellate rule 40(a)(1), 25 4 an ap-
peal is "taken" and the appellate court's jurisdiction is invoked when the
appellant makes its cash deposit. 255 The court reasoned that "[tihe appel-
late process involves many steps, such as transmitting the trial court re-
cord, preparing and responding to the briefs, and presenting oral
argument," but this does not mean that the contract language providing
for payment upon "appeal" is ambiguous.256 The court therefore con-
cluded that when appellant made its cash deposit, the case was 'appealed
to a higher court' under the contract's terms.257
The cost bond procedure has been replaced with notices of appeal.
Under the current appellate rules, "[a]n appeal is perfected when a writ-
ten notice of appeal is filed with the trial court clerk. '258 A notice of
appeal is generally due within 30 days after a final judgment is signed or
within 90 days after final judgment if certain post-judgment motions are
249. Mireles v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety, 993 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-San Antonio),
affd, 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 1999).
250. See, e.g., Thompson, 14 S.W.3d at 854; Pucek, 22 S.W.3d at 66.
251. See Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Tex. 2000).
252. See id. at 859-60.
253. Id. at 860-61.
254. TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(1), amended, 1997.
255. Lopez, 22 S.W.3d at 861.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 862.
258. TEX. R. App. P. 25.1.
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filed.2 59
B. MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL
Under appellate rule 26.3, an appellant may obtain an extension of
time to file its notice of appeal if the party files, within 15 days after the
deadline for filing, (1) a notice of appeal, and (2) a motion for extension
that reasonably explains the need for an extension.2 60 Additionally, a
motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant
acting in good faith files a notice of appeal within the 15-day period in
which appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing dead-
line.261 However, when a motion for extension is implied, it is still neces-
sary for appellant to reasonably explain the need for an extension.262 A
failure to do so will result in a dismissal of the appeal for want of
jurisdiction.263
Moreover, according to the Amarillo Court of Appeals, if appellant
undertakes to explain why the appeal was not timely perfected, that ex-
planation must be both "reasonable" and "plausible. '' 264 In Kidd v. Pax-
ton, the appellants stated that their notice was untimely because (1)
"counsel misunderstood the law by erroneously calculating the perfection
deadline by adding 30 days to the date the trial court overruled the mo-
tion for new trial," and (2) counsel was "preoccupied by other work. '2 65
The court rejected both excuses. The court held that the first excuse was
"implausible, and, therefore, unreasonable," because counsel failed to
abide by the deadline he allegedly miscalculated.2 66 Moreover, the sec-
ond excuse was found to be deficient because counsel failed to establish a
causal nexus between his other work and the default.267 The dissent
found the majority's standard of evaluating appellants' explanation to be
too strict in light of the principle that appeals should not be dismissed for
259. TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(a).
260. TEX. R. App. P. 26.3. See also id. 10.5(b).
261. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).
262. Id.; Chilkewitz v. Winter, 25 S.W.3d 382, 383 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no
pet.); Indus. Servs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Am. Bank, N.A., 17 S.W.3d 358, 359 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2000, no pet.); Smith v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 7 S.W.3d 287, 288 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
263. See Chilkewitz, 25 S.W.3d at 383; Indus. Servs., 17 S.W.3d at 359.
264. See Kidd v. Paxton, 1 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. denied).
Ordinarily, the explanation "need only consist of a plausible statement of circumstances
indicating that the failure to comply with the deadline was neither deliberate nor inten-
tional, 'but ... [rather] the result of inadvertence [sic], mistake, or mischance."' Id. at 310
(quoting Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. 1989)). For example, a
statement that appellant was represented on a contingency fee basis at trial and that it took
a while to find pro bono appellate counsel is a reasonable explanation. See Smith, 7 S.W.3d
at 288.
265. Id. at 310. Counsel explained in his motion that he was preoccupied with other
duties, including a contested probate matter "immediately prior to and following the origi-
nal deadline," a heavy criminal and civil docket, and "several matters set in both the Dis-
trict and County courts of Crosby and Lubbock count[ies] [and] . . . the Federal
Bankruptcy Court." Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 311.
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procedural defects "whenever any arguable interpretation of the appel-
late rules would preserve the appeal. '2 68
C. EXTENSION OF TIME DUE TO DELAYED NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Last Survey period saw the development of a split among the courts of
appeals regarding when a party must move for a determination of late
notice of judgment necessary to postpone the appellate timetable under
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 306a.2 69 During this Survey period,
the Texarkana Court of Appeals joined the decided majority courts and
held that "a party seeking relief under Rule 306a(4) and (5) has thirty
days from the first date he or his attorney receives the clerk's notice or
acquires actual knowledge of the judgment to establish a prima facie
showing of the Rule 306a (5) requirements. '27 0
D. FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
In Olympia Marble & Granite v. Mayes,271 an issue arose regarding
whether a judgment awarding prejudgment interest was interlocutory be-
cause it did not state a specific amount of prejudgment interest. Gener-
ally, where the rate and means of calculating prejudgment interest is a
matter of law, the act of setting that amount is ministerial and the failure
to include the amount in the judgment will not prevent it from being fi-
nal.272 However, "if the record reveals facts that call into question the
date on which prejudgment interest should accrue, then the calculation of
prejudgment interest is not a simple ministerial act," and the judgment is
interlocutory. 273 In Olympia, the court held such a judgment to be inter-
locutory because the record revealed a question about whether "any pe-
riod of delay" by the plaintiff "tolled the accrual of prejudgment
interest." 274
268. Id. at 313-14; see also Leal v. City of Rosenburg, 17 S.W.3d 385, 386 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (refusing to dismiss an appeal because appellant filed a motion for
new trial under the wrong cause number, explaining that because "appellant's efforts con-
stituted a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction, the court should con-
strue them as successful").
269. Cf. Thompson v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 997 S.W.2d 607, 625 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1998, pet. denied); Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 927 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no
writ); Montalvo v. Rio Nat'l bank, 885 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994,
no writ) (all holding that a 306a(5) motion must be filed within thirty days of receiving
notice) with Grondona v. Sutton, 991 S.W.2d 90, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. de-
nied); Vineyard Bay Dev. Co. v. Vineyard on Lake Travis, 864 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, writ denied) (both holding that a 306a(5) motion need not be filed
within thirty days of receiving notice).
270. John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2000, Rule 53(f) motion filed Apr. 3, 2000).
271. 17 S.W.3d 437, 440-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
272. Id. at 441 (citing Ortiz v. Avante Villa, 926 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1996, writ denied)).
273. Id. at 442; see also Fuller-Austin Insulation Co. v. Bilder, 960 S.W.2d 914, 923 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. dism'd); Zamarripa v. Sifuentes, 929 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bay, 808 S.W.2d 678, 680
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
274. Id. at 443.
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Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(h), any change to the judg-
ment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will
restart the appellate timetable.2 75 In Quanaim v. Frasco Restaurant &
Catering,276 the court faced the task of determining which of three sepa-
rate orders granting summary judgment constituted the final judgment.277
The court determined that the second order disposed of all claims and
parties, but a question remained as to whether the third order vacated,
set aside, modified, or amended the final judgment so that the appellate
timetable ran from the later date.2 78
The court held that it did, explaining that "the trial court's entry of a
subsequent order identifying different grounds for summary judgment
should be construed as a change sufficient to restart the appellate timeta-
ble under Rule 329b(h)." 27 9 Thus, even though there was nothing in the
record to intimate that the trial court intended to vacate its earlier order,
the court of appeals treated the later order granting summary judgment
as a modification, correction, or reformation of the earlier order granting
summary judgment, and concluded that "the trial court presumptively va-
cated" its earlier order.280
E. AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COSTS
Must a minor file an affidavit of indigence under Rule 20.1281 as a pred-
icate to being declared indigent for purposes of appealing an adjudication
of delinquency? In In re K.C.A.,282 the supreme court said no. 283
The Family Code, and not the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
governs juvenile indigent appeals. 284 Sections 56.01(c)(1)(A) and
54.03(a) of the Family Code provide for a right to appeal delinquency
findings, and section 56.01 provides that the court can consider the assets
and income of the child and the child's parents in determining whether a
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(g) ("If a judgment is modified, corrected, or reformed in any
respect, the time for appeal shall run from the time the modified, corrected, or reformed
judgment is signed.") (emphasis added).
276. 17 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
277. Id. at 34-41. On May 5, 1998, the trial court granted summary judgment for Fran-
sco on a ground that disposed of all of its claims against Quanaim. On May 11, 1998, the
trial court granted Quanaim's motion for summary judgment against Fransco. And on
May 18, 1998, the trial court granted another motion for summary judgment in favor of
Fransco, but on different grounds than the May 5 judgment. See id. at 34.
278. Id. at 37.
279. Id. at 40.
280. Id. at 39-40.
281. Rule 20.1(a) provides:
A party who cannot pay the costs in an appellate court may proceed without
advance payment of costs if: (1) the party files an affidavit of indigence in
compliance with this rule; (2) the claim of indigence is not contested or, if
contested, the contest is not sustained by written order; and (3) the party
timely files a notice of appeal.
TEX. R. App. P. 20.1(a).
282. 36 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. 2000).
283. No. 99-0986 d2000 WL 798107 (Tex. Jun. 22, 2000).
284. Id. at 502
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juvenile is indigent.285 Further, section 56.02 provides that the court re-
porter must provide a free transcript "if the court finds, after hearing or
on an affidavit filed by the child's parent or other person responsible for
support of the child that the parent or other responsible person is unable
to pay" or provide security.286 Because Family Code section 56.02 allows
the court to determine the minor's indigence based on either (1) a hear-
ing, or (2) an affidavit filed by the minor's parents, "a Rule 20.1 affidavit
is not required, and a hearing will suffice. '287
The deadlines for challenging an affidavit of indigence and for trial
court action on the challenge are strictly construed.28 8 Under Rule
20.1(e), the trial court clerk, the court reporter, or any other party may
challenge an appellant's claim of indigence by filing a contest within ten
days after the affidavit is filed.289 Under Rule 20.1(i), the trial court must
sign an order either sustaining the indigence contest or extending the
time for hearing the challenge within ten days after the contest was filed
or referred to the trial court.290 If either of these ten-day deadlines are
not met, the allegations in the affidavit of indigence will be deemed true,
and the trial court clerk and court reporter must prepare the appellate
record without advance payment of cost.291 Further, the obligation to
accept the allegations in the affidavit as true will be imposed even if the
appellant's affidavit fails to comply with the strict requirements of Rule
20.1(b). 292
F. PRISONER NOTICES OF APPEAL
Cases decided this Survey period demonstrate that Texas courts will
not will not give pro se prisoners a break when they attempt to perfect
appeals in civil cases. For example, in Kinnard v. Carnahan,293 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal
will not be deemed timely filed if it was timely deposited in a prison mail
receptacle. 294 Although federal courts deem prisoner notices of appeal
filed on the date they are delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to
the trial court clerk, the court held that Texas appellate rules are not sub-
ject to such a reading.295 Under Rule 2, the court reasoned, appellate
courts are forbidden to "alter the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil
case. ' 296 And under Rule 9.2(b), "a prison mail receptacle is not a
285. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 56.01(c)(1)(A), 54.03(a), 56.01(l), (m) (Vernon 2000).
286. Id. § 56.02(b).
287. K.C.A., 36 S.W.3d at 502.
288. In re G.C., 22 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2000); In re B.A.C., 4 S.W.3d 322, 323 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism'd).
289. TEX. R. App. P. 20.1(e).
290. TEX. R. App. P. 20.1(i)(2).
291. Id. 20.1(f), (i)(4), (j); see G.C., 22 S.W.3d at 933; B.A.C., 4 S.W.3d at 323.
292. See B.A.C., 4 S.W.3d at 324-25 (holding that the court reporter lost the right to
challenge the appellant's affidavit by failing to raise the challenge in a timely manner).
293. 25 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
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mailbox for purposes of the mailbox rule."297 "
In Thomas v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division,298
the court held that a prisoner's filing of a post-judgment motion to rein-
state prevented him from being entitled to 6 months in which to file his
notice of appeal under the Rule 30, governing restricted appeals. 299 Ac-
cordingly, the prisoner's notice of appeal was due 90 days after the sign-
ing of the order dismissing the case, rendering the prisoner's notice of
appeal over 3 weeks late.
IX. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
Before the Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended effective Sep-
tember 1, 1997, the appellant had the burden to provide to the appellate
court a record sufficient to prove error.300 If appellant failed to meet that
burden, the appellate court presumed that the missing portions of the
record supported the trial court's decision. 30 1
Under the current rules, the court reporter has the responsibility to
prepare, certify, and timely file the reporter's record.30 2 However, the
court reporter's burden does not attach until the appellant files a notice
of appeal, requests the preparation of the reporter's record, and pays for
or makes arrangements to pay for the court reporter's record.
30 3
The court in In re Spiegel304 held that, although appellant's burden with
regard to the reporter's record is relaxed under the current appellate
297. Id. (intended quotations omitted). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.2(b)
states: A document received within ten days after the filing deadline is considered timely
filed if:
(A) it was sent to the proper clerk by United States Postal Service first-class,
express, registered, or certified mail;
(B) it was placed in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and
stamped; and
(C) it was deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing.
TEX. R. App. P. 9.2(b) (emphasis added).
298. 3 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
299. Id. at 667. Rule 30 provides:
A party who did not participate-either in person or through counsel-in the
hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and who did not timely
file a postjudgment motion ... may file a notice of appeal within [six months
after the judgment or order is signed] permitted by Rule 26.1(c). TEX. R.
App. P. 30.
300. See Bryant v. United Shortline, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998).
301. Id.; Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. 1991).
302. Rule 35.3(b) provides:
The official or deputy reporter is responsible for preparing certifying, and
timely filing the reporter's record if:
(1) a notice of appeal has been filed;
(2) the appellant has requested that the reporter's record be prepared; and
(3) the party responsible for paying for the preparation of the reporter's re-
cord has paid the reporter's fee, or has made satisfactory arrangements with
the reporter to pay the fee, or is entitled to appeal without paying the fee.
TEX. R. App. P. 35.3(b).
303. Id.; see also Mills v. Haggard, 17 S.W.3d 462, 462-63 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no
pet.).
304. 6 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
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rules, a complete failure to request the reporter's record can defeat an
appeal. Spiegel involved the appeal of the trial court's denial of appel-
lant's request for a temporary injunction. 30 5 The trial court's orders
stated that the reasons for denying the request was "on record. ' 306 How-
ever, the clerk's record (which was properly filed with the appellate
court) did not reflect the trial court's reasons for denying the temporary
injunction, and the appellant specifically opted not to request the re-
porter's record.30 7 The court of appeals held that, even under the new
rules, "the onus upon an appellant to secure an adequate appellate re-
cord ... still exists in a limited way."'308 Because the appellant did not
satisfy his burden of requesting and paying for a reporter's record, the
court applied the presumption established in Bryant and Schafer "that the
missing record supports the trial court's determination. ' 30 9 Further, the
court held that appellate rule 37.3, which requires appellate courts to ad-
dress issues that do not need the reporter's record for decision, implicitly
gives appellate courts the authority to decide not to consider those issues
that are dependent on the reporter's record.310 Accordingly, the court
decided to "forgo reviewing the dispute" and "affirm[ed] the orders de-
nying the application for temporary injunction because [appellant] opted
not to provide [the court] with a complete record. '311
Section 105.003 of the Texas Family Code mandates that a record of the
proceedings in suits affecting the parent-child relationship shall be made
as in civil cases generally unless waived by the parties with the consent of
the court. 312 In In re Vega, 313 no record was made of a final hearing es-
tablishing the paternity, conservatorship, possession, and child support of
four children. The order contained a notation that the "record of the
proceedings was waived," but Vega (who represented himself pro se) was
not present at the hearing.314 The court of appeals held that the making
of the record was mandatory and that the trial court erred by consenting
to a waiver of the making of the record in Vega's absence.315
X. ABATEMENT OF APPEAL
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 allows appellate courts to sus-
pend the operation of a rule and to order a different procedure to expe-
305. Id. at 645.
306. Id.
307. Id. In fact, the appellant affirmatively stated on his docketing statement that he
would "not request a Reporter's Record." See id.
308. Id. at 646.
309. Id.
310. Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d at 646 n.1.
311. Id. at 646.
312. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.003 (Vernon 2000). In construing section 105.003's
predecessor, the Texas Supreme Court has held that the trial court has an affirmative duty
to insure that such a record is prepared and that a failure to do so constitutes reversible
error; see Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Tex. 1985).




APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
dite a decision or for other good cause.316 In Mills v. Haggard,317 the
court applied Rule 2 in abating the appeal so that the trial court could
resolve a dispute between the appellant and the court reporters regarding
whether the appellant had made arrangements to pay for the court re-
porter's record. Mills asked the court of appeals to order the court re-
porters to appear before it and to "show cause why they should not be
ordered to file the record. '318 Stating that an appellate court was not the
appropriate forum for an evidentiary show cause hearing, the court of
appeals suspended the rule mandating the filing of the reporter's record,
abated the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of payment for the reporter's record.
319
In Peavy v. Texas Home Management, Inc.,320 the court of appeals gen-
erously abated an appeal to give appellee another shot at demonstrating
that it was entitled to an extension of time to file its motion for rehearing.
The court stated that it could have denied the motion for additional time
because appellee's allegation that its counsel did not receive notice of the
court of appeals' decision in time was too conclusory. 321 Instead, the
court decided to abate the appeal "[i]n the spirit of fairness and equity"
and to allow the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
matter.32
2
In Costilla Energy, Inc. v. GNK, Inc. ,323 the court reinstated an appeal
following an automatic stay entered by the bankruptcy court and applied
appellate rule 8.2324 to calculate the new appellate deadlines.325 The ap-
peal in that case had been suspended from September 3, 1999 (the date
appellant filed its bankruptcy petition) to March 1, 2000 (the date of the
reinstatement order). 326 Accordingly, the clerk's record, which had been
filed during the abatement, was deemed filed on March 1, 2000.327 Ab-
sent the bankruptcy, the reporter's record would have been due 120 days
316. TEX. R. App. P. 2.
317. 17 S.W.3d 462, 463 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.).
318. Id. at 462.
319. Id. at 463.
320. 16 S.W.3d 104, 105 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. 15 S.W.3d 579, 580 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.).
324. Rule 8.2 provides:
A bankruptcy suspends the appeal and all periods in these rules from the
date when the bankruptcy petition is filed until the appellate court reinstates
or severs the appeal in accordance with federal law. A period that began to
run and had not expired at the time the proceeding was suspended begins
anew when the proceeding is reinstated or severed under 8.3. A document
filed by a party while the proceeding is suspended will be deemed filed on
the same day, but after, the court reinstates or severs the appeal and will not
be considered ineffective because it was filed while the proceeding was
suspended.
TEX. R. App. P. 8.2





after judgment was signed (because motions for new trial were filed). 328
According to Rule 8.2, the 120-day period began "anew" on the date of
reinstatement, so the reporter's record became due on June 29, 2000, 120
days after the order of reinstatement. 329
XI. WAIVER ON APPEAL
When a summary judgment does not state the specific grounds on
which it was granted, a failure to attack on appeal each of the indepen-
dent arguments alleged in the motion will result in an affirmance of the
judgment. 330 In Smith v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,3 3 1 for example,
the trial court did not specifically identify the particular ground upon
which summary judgment was granted.332 Although the appellee had ar-
gued failure to exhaust alternative remedies in its summary judgment mo-
tion, appellant failed to address that argument in its motion for new trial
or appellate brief.333 The court of appeals had no choice but to affirm the
judgment "because it may have been based on a ground not specifically
challenged by appellant. '334
Waiver also results when an appellant attempts to raise an argument
for the first time on appeal in a motion for rehearing.335 It is well estab-
lished that, by failing to raise an issue prior to submission, an appellant
will waive presentation and consideration of the complaint to the appel-
late court. 336
XII. DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
A. REMAND IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN THE LAW
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 60.2(f), the supreme court
may "vacate the lower court's judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings in light of changes in the law."' 337 The supreme court found a
new application for this rule in a series of four "Jane Doe" cases constru-
ing Texas's parental notification statute, which generally allows a minor
to have an abortion without notifying her parents if she demonstrates that
she is mature and well-informed, that notification would not be in her
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Smith v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 7 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston




334. Id. at 291. The court noted, however, that a general point of error stating that "the
trial court erred by granting the motion for summary judgment" would have been suffi-
cient to preserve error for all possible grounds on which summary judgment should have
been denied. Id.
335. McElwee v. Estate of Joham, 15 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.).
336. See id.
337. TEx. R. App. P. 60.2(f).
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best interests, or that notification may lead to abuse.338 In the first two
"Jane Doe" decisions, the court established, for the first time, the require-
ments for a judicial bypass of the parental notification requirement.339 In
light of the fact that they did not have the benefit of the supreme court's
interpretation of this "unique or novel statutory scheme" in the trial
court, the minors in each case failed to satisfy the new requirements as a
matter of law.340 Relying on Rule 60.2(f), the supreme court vacated the
trial courts' decisions (even though the trial courts did not specifically
err) and remanded the cases for subsequent hearings in light of the new
standards. 341
In disposing of the cases, the court recognized that it had never before
applied Rule 60.2(f) to remand for a new hearing in the trial court, but
reasoned that it was proper to do so because "the rule's plain language
does not preclude us from doing so."' 342 Justice Hecht dissented in each
case, arguing that "an errorless judgment of a trial court cannot be re-
versed in the interest of justice" and that "[t]he Court should not be or-
dering new trials just because it would like to see a different result. 343
In Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel,344 the court would have remanded
the case to the trial court to allow appellant to allocate settlement credits
consistent with supreme court authority decided after the trial of the case.
However, because appellant had fully released its judgment against ap-
pellee, the settlement credit issue became moot and remand was no
longer necessary. 345 The court vacated the part of the court of appeals
judgment ordering the remand but refused to vacate the part of the opin-
ion discussing the settlement credit issue, reasoning that "settlement or
release does not automatically require vacating an opinion. ' '346
B. RENDITION VERSUS REMAND FOLLOWING
CHARGE ERROR REVERSAL
After an appellate court determines that error in a jury charge is re-
versible, the proper disposition on appeal depends on whether the error
is an omission or a defect.347 If the question submitted is merely defec-
338. In re Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 283-84
(Tex. 2000); In re Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d 300, 300-01 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322,
326-27 (Tex. 2000).
339. Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d at 256-57; Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 282-83.
340. Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d at 257; Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 283; Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d at 300; Doe 4,
19 S.W.3d at 326.
341. Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d at 257; Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 283-84; Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d at 300; Doe
4, 19 S.W.3d at 326. Notably, in Doe 3, four justices would have rendered judgment for
Doe and only two voted to remand. Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d at 301. The court was constrained to
grant the lesser relief because a majority of the court did not agree on remand or rendition.
See id. (citing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 622 n.4, 626 (Tex. 1993)).
342. Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d at 314; Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 283.
343. Id. at 295-96.
344. 22 S.W.3d 368, 392 (Tex. 2000).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Borneman v. Steak & Ale of Tex., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 411, 413 (Tex. 2000).
2001] 1131
SMU LAW REVIEW
tive (i.e., the party plainly attempted to request a finding on a recognized
cause of action but did so improperly), the proper disposition is re-
mand.348 If the question is omitted (i.e., the party refused to submit a
theory of recovery by, for example, choosing one theory of recovery over
another), the proper disposition is rendition. 349 In Borneman, the su-
preme court held that a jury question that failed to track applicable statu-
tory language was a charge defect, not an omission, and therefore
remanded the case to the court below. 350 The court similarly found a jury
question to be defective in Stevens v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs.,351 but because
appellant prayed only for rendition and specifically asked the court not to
remand the case for new trial, the court denied the petition for review.
C. REMAND TO REDEFINE CLASS DEFINITION
In Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson,352 the supreme court refused to modify a
flawed class definition because it would interfere with the trial court's
broad discretion and responsibility to manage a class action. However, it
may be appropriate for an appellate court to redefine a class "in those
limited instances when correcting the definitional infirmity d[oes] not in-
terfere with the trial court's discretion and oversight of the class
action."353
D. DISPOSITION AS TO PARTY NOT NAMED ON APPEAL
In Kagan-Edelman Enters. v. Bond,354 Bond (plaintiff below) appealed
an unfavorable judgment against certain defendants but failed to list "Ka-
gan-Edelman as a party or raise any issue on appeal with regard to that
entity. ' 355 The court of appeals reversed the judgment as to all defend-
ants, including Kagan-Edelman. 356 Holding that the court of appeals
erred in reversing as to Kagan-Edelman, the supreme court severed Ka-
gan-Edelman's petition for review, reversed the court of appeals' judg-
ment in part, and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Kagan-
Edelman.357
E. COURT OF APPEALS' AUTHORITY TO VACATE
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
Before the 1997 amendments to the appellate rules, courts of appeals
348. Id.; Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. 1999);
Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994).
349. Borneman, 22 S.W.3d at 413; State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne,
838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992).
350. 22 S.W.3d at 413-14.
351. 11 S.W.3d 185, 186 (Tex. 2000).
352. 22 S.W.3d 398, 406-08 (Tex. 2000).
353. Id. at 407.
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were without authority to "vacate" a trial court's judgment.358 Now,
Rule 43.2 specifically allows courts of appeals to "vacate the trial court's
judgment and dismiss the case."'359 Accordingly, in Young Materials
Corp. v. Smith,360 the Waco Court of Appeals granted the parties' agreed
motion pursuant to settlement, vacating the trial court judgment and dis-
missing the case.
XIII. SPECIAL APPEALS
Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant may limit
his appeal to a specific error by the trial court. However, to do so, the
appellant must strictly comply with Rule 34.6(c)'s requirement for includ-
ing in his request for a partial reporter's record a statement of the points
or issues to be presented on appeal. 361 Under this requirement, both the
request for a partial reporter's record and the statement of points or is-
sues to be presented on appeal must be timely filed and appear in the
appellate record.362 Strict compliance is necessary to activate the pre-
sumption that the omitted portions of the record are irrelevant. 363 If no
request or document that provides the same information is filed of re-
cord, the other party is prevented from requesting additional portions of
the record that might be relevant to the appeal.364 When the requisite
information is not provided as the rule requires, the court of appeals
"must presume that the omitted portions of the record are relevant to this
appeal and that the missing evidence supports the trial court's judg-
ment. '365 Notably, when an appellant does properly restrict his appeal to
certain issues pursuant to Rule 34.6(c), his appeal is limited to those is-
sues properly designated, and other issues are not before the appellate
court.
3 6 6
XIV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SUBMIT A
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
In Texas Workers' Compensation Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer 11,367 the su-
preme court held that the trial court does not abuse its discretion by re-
358. Rothlander v. Ayala, 943 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
359. TEx. R. App. P. 43.2(e).
360. 4 S.W.3d 84, 85 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.).
361. Hilton v. Hillman Distrib. Co., 12 S.W.3d 846, 847 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no
pet.).
362. Id. at 847-48.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 848. A notice of appeal that reflects the appellant's desire to limit his appeal
and contains a statement of the points or issues to be presented on appeal can meet the
requirements of Rule 34.6(c). Id. (citing CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437,
440 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
365. Id.
366. In re R.C., a Child, No. 02-99-00397-CV, 2000 WL 1459806, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2000, no pet.).
367. 34 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. 2000).
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fusing to define a term or otherwise instruct the jury on a term that is not
used in the charge. At trial after reversal and remand for a new trial, the
plaintiff requested three instructions on producing cause, which the trial
court refused to submit.368 The supreme court articulated the standard
for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
submit a requested instruction: "the question on appeal is whether the
request was reasonably necessary to enable the jury to render a proper
verdict. Further, for an instruction to be proper, it must (1) assist the
jury; (2) accurately state the law; and (3) find support in the pleadings
and the evidence. '369 Here, the court held there was no abuse of discre-
tion because the plaintiff did not plead or try his case under a producing
cause theory and because the charge submitted the relevant jury question
in terms of "resulting from," not producing cause. 370
B. REVIEW IN QUASI-CRIMINAL CASES
Section 524.031 of the Transportation Code provides for an administra-
tive hearing to challenge the suspension of a driver's license following an
arrest for drunk driving. 371 In Mireles v. Texas Dep't of Safety,372 the
driver challenged the AL's decision to suspend and the court of appeals'
affirmance of his license suspension, claiming that the breath-test results
taken one hour after he was stopped were no evidence that his blood
alcohol level was above the legal limit. The supreme court held that, al-
though sufficiency of the evidence reviews in criminal cases have a high
standard, appellate courts review an administrative license suspension de-
cision using the deferential substantial evidence standard. 373 Under that
standard, the appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency, but must determine whether there is "some reasonable basis
for the agency's action" in the record.374 Indeed, even if the evidence
preponderates against the agency's decision, the court must affirm the
administrative decision, so long as there is more than a scintilla of evi-
dence to support it.375 The court concluded that, because the breath-test
results "are more than a scintilla of evidence to support the AL's find-
ing," the license suspension was proper.376
In State v. $217,590,377 a civil forfeiture case, the supreme court articu-
lated the standard for reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether
a person's consent to a search was voluntary. The court held that the
368. Id.
369. Id. at 912 (citations omitted).
370. Id.
371. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 524.031 (Vernon 2000).
372. 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 1999).
373. Id. at 131.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 132.
377. 18 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 2000).
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issue involves questions of both fact and law.378 Because trial court deci-
sions on mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion, that standard applies to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence based on the argument that a claimant's consent was not
voluntary.379
C. REVIEW FOR SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Andrade,380 the supreme court rejected the
Beaumont Court of Appeals' holding that appellate courts are only re-
quired to conduct a factual sufficiency or great weight and preponderance
reviews in gross negligence cases in which the amount of the punitive
damages awarded has been preserved. The court stated: "The notion that
a party is not entitled to factual-sufficiency review of a gross-negligence
finding and that such review is limited to challenges to the amount of
punitive damages is simply incorrect."' 38 ' Indeed, appellate courts "have
a duty to resolve such issues if necessary to final disposition of the
appeal.'"382
D. REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION WAIVER
Under the procedures established in the Texas Parental Notification
Statute, a pregnant minor can petition to the court for a judicial bypass to
have an abortion without telling her parents.383 Section 33.003(i) of the
Family Code states that the court "shall enter an order" that the minor is
authorized to have an abortion if she demonstrates "by a preponderance
of the evidence [that she] is mature and sufficiently well informed to
make the decision to have an abortion performed without notification to
either of her parents" or that "notification would not be in [her] best
interest" or that "notification may lead to physical, sexual, or emotional
abuse. ' 384 In a series of "Jane Doe" opinions, the supreme court articu-
378. The determination of the historical facts leading up to the consent is a question of
fact, while the assessment of whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates volun-
tary consent is a question of law. See id. at 633.
379. See id.
380. 19 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 1999).
381. Id. at 248. The Beaumont court's misconception may have arisen from the fact
that the supreme court did not conduct a factual sufficiency review in Transp. Ins. Co. v.
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994). Id. However, the court reviewed only the legal suffi-
ciency of punitive damages evidence in Moriel because the supreme court, unlike courts of
appeals, has no jurisdiction to conduct a factual sufficiency review. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. V,§ 6.
382. Louisiana Pacific, 19 S.W.3d at 248.
383. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2000).
384. Id. The supreme court has rejected proposals by amicus curiae to require trial
courts to apply a higher burden of proof than preponderance of the evidence. The court
explained:
[A]lthough the Legislature could have chosen to impose a higher standard of
proof, such as by requiring the minor to establish the statutory requisites by
"clear and convincing" proof or proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," it did
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lated the standard for reviewing the trial court's findings on maturity, the
minor's best interests, and the potential for abuse. 385
First, appellate courts review a trial court's maturity finding under a
factual and legal sufficiency standard of review.386 The supreme court
held that the determination of maturity is a question of fact, reasoning
that section 33.003's "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof
implies that the trial court's duty in this regard is to find facts by weighing
the evidence and determining the credibility of the minor.387 Further, the
court determined that the factual and legal sufficiency standard was more
appropriate than an abuse of discretion standard because the trial court
has no discretion over the order. 388 Under the statute, if the court finds
that the minor is "mature and sufficiently well informed," it "shall enter
an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance of the
abortion" without her parents' consent.389
Second, appellate courts review a trial court's "best interest" determi-
nation using the abuse of discretion standard of review. 390 Unlike the
determination on maturity, in which the trial court is solely making fac-
tual findings, the best interest determination "requires the trial court to
balance the possible benefits and detriments to the minor in notifying her
parents," which necessarily involves the exercise of judicial discretion.391
Third, appellate courts review the trial court's "potential for abuse"
determination using the legal and factual sufficiency standard of review
for the same reasons that standard is employed to review findings on
maturity.392
E. REVIEW OF A TRIAL COURT'S CHOICE OF LAW
Ultimate choice of law decisions are questions of law for the court to
decide.393 But determining the state contacts to be considered by the
court in rendering its choice of law decision involves a factual inquiry.394
Thus, a summary judgment movant seeking to have the law of another
state applied has the burden of proof with respect to fact questions neces-
sary to the choice of law decision.395
not do so. Instead, it set the level of proof at the lower "preponderance of
the evidence" standard .... For this Court to impose a standard different
than that our Legislature chose would usurp the legislative function and
amount to judicial activism.
In re Doe 1 (II), 19 S.W.3d 346, 350-51 (Tex. 2000).
385. In re Doe 1 (I), 19 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tex. 2000); In re Doe 1 (II), 19 S.W.3d 346
(Tex. 2000); In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 283-84 (Tex. 2000).
386. Doe 1 (1), 19 S.W.3d at 253.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. (citing Tex. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (Vernon 2000)).
390. Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 281.
391. Id.
392. Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 283 n.27.
393. See Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Tex. 2000).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 205.
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XV. FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
In Bridges v. Robinson,396 the Houston Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals awarded sanctions under appellate rule 45397 based on its finding
that appellants brought their appeal in bad faith and for purposes of de-
lay.398 Bridges was a wrongful death action with "bizarre and horrendous
proof" that Dillard's Department Store, its off-duty police officers serv-
ing as security guards and Houston on-duty police officers "hogtied" and
beat the plaintiff's husband to death.399 After the trial court denied the
defendants' summary judgment motions on the defenses of derivative and
official immunity, they all sought interlocutory appeal. 400
Appellee moved for sanctions, arguing that, "because the existence of
material facts in dispute is so obvious, appellants brought this appeal in
bad faith and for the explicit purpose of delaying an upcoming trial set-
ting. '401 The Houston court agreed that the appeals were "objectively
frivolous," explaining that the record was "replete" with contradictory
proof that appellants ignored in their appellate briefing, although counsel
admitted at oral argument that the unmentioned evidence "reflected
sadly upon her clients. '402 The court was also offended by the fact that
appellate counsel justified its failure to acknowledge "bad facts" by citing
to the dissenting opinion in a case as controlling authority.40 3
The court also agreed that the City of Houston brought the appeal for
purposes of delay, finding that the City had a history of filing interlocu-
tory appeals in the case or threatening to do so just before trial dates for
the stated purpose of "keep[ing] this case on appeal into the
millennium. "404
XVI. PLENARY JURISDICTION OF THE
COURTS OF APPEALS
An appellate court's plenary power over its judgment expires "(a) 60
days after judgment if no timely filed motion to extend time or motion for
rehearing is then pending; or (b) 30 days after the court overrules all
timely filed motions for rehearing and motions to extend time to file a
motion for rehearing. '40 5
A party may file a motion for rehearing within 15 days after the court
396. 20 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
397. See TEX. R. App. P. 45 ("If the court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivo-
lous, it may-on motion of any party or on its own initiative, after notice and a reasonable
opportunity for response-award each prevailing party just damages.").
398. Bridges, 20 S.W.3d at 116-19.
399. Id. at 110.
400. Id. at 107.
401. Id. at 114-15.
402. Id. at 116-17.
403. Id. at 116.
404. Id. at 118.
405. TEX. R. App. P. 19.1.
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of appeals issues its judgment or order.40 6 A party may bring another
motion for rehearing within 15 days after the court of appeals disposes of
a motion for rehearing if the court "(a) modifies its judgment; (b) vacates
its judgment and renders a new judgment; or (c) issues an opinion in
overruling a motion for rehearing. '407 When the court of appeals simply
denies a motion for rehearing, none of these situations applies and a fur-
ther motion for rehearing has no effect.40 8
Accordingly, a court of appeals has no authority to grant a second mo-
tion for rehearing after 30 days has expired from the date it denied a first
motion for rehearing, where the second motion was not permitted be-
cause the first motion was simply denied without opinion or modification
of the judgment.40 9
XVII. THE MANDATE
After a case is appealed and remanded, the court of appeals generally
has discretion to assess costs in subsequent appellate proceedings.410
However, in Mandlbauer II, the supreme court found the court of ap-
peals' mandate that "all costs of the appeal shall be assessed against [the
Fund]" to be ambiguous because it did "not limit costs to the appeal on
remand. '411 The court explained that the mandate could be read to in-
clude the costs in the court of appeals that the supreme court ordered
Mandlbauer to pay, but because the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals, all costs of the appeal were awarded against Mandlbauer for all
appeals. 412
XVIII. PETITIONS FOR REVIEW
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that petitions for re-
view include a "Statement of Jurisdiction" that states, "without argument,
the basis of the Court's jurisdiction. '413 The rule does not provide for a
page limit for the jurisdictional statement. Nonetheless, the Texas Su-
preme Court in Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson414 struck the petitioner's peti-
tion for review and ordered it redrawn because the jurisdictional
statement was over five pages long. 415 The jurisdictional basis for the
petition was that the court of appeals' decision conflicted with six prior
406. TEX. R. App. P. 49.1; Davis v. Methodist Hosp., 4 S.W.3d 389, 389 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
407. TEX. R. App. P. 49.5; Davis, 4 S.W.3d at 389.
408. Davis, 4 S.W.3d at 389.
409. Kacal v. Cohen, 13 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (withdrawing
order granting second motion for rehearing and reinstating judgment).
410. See Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer II, 34 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Tex.
2000).
411. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).
412. See id.
413. TEX. R. App. P. 53.2(e).
414. No. 00-0792, 2000 WL 1508842 (Tex. Oct. 12, 2000).
415. Id. at *1.
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decisions of other appellate courts on material questions of law.416 Dis-
senting from the order striking the petition, Justice Hecht, joined by Jus-
tice Owen, argued that the jurisdictional statement did not violate Rule
53.2.417 That rule, Justice Hecht explained, prohibits diverting argument
on the merits into the jurisdictional statement in an attempt to circum-
vent the 15-page limit on argument.418 The rule does not prohibit a con-
cise explanation of the basis for jurisdiction. According to Justice Hecht,
a petition invoking the Court's conflict jurisdiction is required to cite each
case asserted to be in conflict and "plainly and specifically state the point
of conflict" as well. 419 He rejected the respondents' argument that, ac-
cording to Rule 53.2(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
explanation of the basis for jurisdiction belongs in the argument. 420
"[T]he express concern of Rule 56.1," he maintained, "is whether judicial
discretion to grant review should be exercised, not whether jurisdiction
over the case exists." Argument relating to the Rule 56.1 factors and an
explanation of the statutory basis for the existence of jurisdiction are not
the same-"the former belongs in the argument section of the peti-
tion, . . . the latter belongs in the jurisdictional statement."'421
416. Id. (Hecht J., dissenting).
417. Id. (Hecht J., dissenting).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. Rule 53.2(i) states: "The argument should state the reasons why the Supreme
Court should exercise jurisdiction to hear the case with specific reference to the factors
listed in Rule 56.1(a)." TEX. R. App. P. 53.2(i).
421. Aktiengesellschaft, 2000 WL 1508842 at *1. The dissent also argued that the
Court's action in striking the petition was "arbitrary." Id. at *2.
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